

SEP 5 1947

Is the Constitution Un-American?

THE *Nation*

September 6, 1947

America and the U. N.

A Preview of the General Assembly

BY THOMAS J. HAMILTON

✱

The Palestine Report

AN EDITORIAL

✱

Two Views of Britain's Crisis

BY THE *ECONOMIST* AND AYLMER VALLANCE

✱

The Death of Lyuh Woon-Hyung

BY HUGH DEANE

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THE *Nation*

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 165

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NUMBER 10

The Shape of Things.

HAD IT NOT BECOME INURED TO MASSACRE, the world would be horrified at what is going on these days in the Punjab. Reports from the region of Amritsar and Lahore estimate the weekly death toll of Moslems and Sikhs at about five thousand. Tens of thousands of helpless refugees are crowding the rain-sodden roads in a desperate attempt to find haven from gangs of fanatics bent on killing. The Prime Ministers of Independent India and Pakistan—Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan—are touring the areas where violence is most intense and appealing for an end to the communal war. So far, the appeals have had little effect. Some will say that this is the first bitter fruit of independence, the evil foretaste of greater trouble to come. Others, more accurately, will diagnose it as the logical outcome of a campaign of agitation and threats which was all too successful in making converts among extremists in the Moslem and Sikh communities. What must be recognized is that the Punjab is as yet an isolated instance of failure. The predicted general conflict between Hindus and Moslems has not materialized, and the two communities have shown a mutual toleration, and their cooperation has surprised even the optimists. The program of economic and political reform mapped out by Nehru, if challenged by the wealthy landlords, princes, and industrialists, is finding support among the masses of the people—Moslem and Hindu alike—in independent India. And, if we are to believe the words of Jinnah, Pakistan, perhaps by a less democratic road, is aiming at similar economic and political goals. The real struggle shaping up in India will not be one rooted in ancient feuds and superstition but rather a struggle against reaction and toward a more decent life for the Indian people.

★

THREE MONTHS AGO, IN THESE PAGES, Leonard Engel predicted that atomic energy could be made available for peace-time uses within two or three years. Last week-end's announcement of the successful operation of an atomic-power plant that uses fast instead of slow neutrons, confirms this prediction. According to Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, director of the Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratory, the new process is "in a sense a controlled version of the bomb," the energy being released at a steady rate of flow instead of in one explosion. The size of the reactor is so reduced that the experts say it can be used to propel large ships and locomotives, in addition to bringing power to industries far removed from coal, oil, and hydroelectric installations. We are within sight of the second industrial revolution, the consequences of which will be scarcely less far-reaching than those of the first. All of which will, we trust, have some effect in weaning our age away from its present morbid obsession with atomic bombs. The scientists at the United Nations can hardly be blamed. They have just produced a series of reports that seem to provide an adequate basis for international accord on a system of control which, when established, will free peace-time atomic-energy development from its present shrouds of secrecy. Russia, which shows no signs of accepting the new proposals, would stand to gain perhaps even more than we from the vast flow of new power. For the life of us, we can't see what it would lose by becoming a party to a control which we now exercise as a monopoly.

★

NOT TOO SLYLY, THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS suggests that the executives of I. G. Farben are on trial at Nürnberg "because the German army lost the war." There, but for the Grace of Allied arms, it concludes, go Knudsen, Ford, and the officials of General Motors, Chrysler, and du Pont. Had it mentioned Standard Oil of New Jersey, the Aluminum Corporation of America, and Dow Chemical, all of which had close dealings with Farben, its point might have been better taken, but even so it would have fallen wide of the mark. The real point of the trials is that the defendants are accused, not of maintaining the most suffocating cartel ever imposed on world trade, but of committing war crimes for which their accomplices in high office have already been jailed or hanged. We would feel better about the trials if they were, in fact, part of a coherent campaign to smash a national economic machine that twice made it possible for German governments to plunge the world in horror.

• IN THIS ISSUE •

EDITORIALS

The Shape of Things	213
America's Guilt in Britain's Crisis	215
The Palestine Report	216

ARTICLES

Politics and People <i>by Robert Bendiner</i>	218
Washington and the United Nations <i>by Thomas J. Hamilton</i>	219
Crisis for British Labor <i>by Aylmer Vallance</i>	221
Is the Constitution Un-American? <i>by I. F. Stone</i>	223
Cartoon: Loyalty Tests <i>by Ezekiel Schloss</i>	224
Poland Today. III. Foreign and Domestic Politics <i>by Alexander Werth</i>	226
The Death of Lyuh Woon-Hyung <i>by Hugh Deane</i>	228
Europe Is Skeptical <i>by Del Vayo</i>	230

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

Shabby Götterdämmerung <i>by Alfred Guérard</i>	231
Baudelaire and Others <i>by René Blanc-Roos</i>	232
Hawks and Acorns <i>by Joseph Wood Krutch</i>	234
What Price Prejudice <i>by Carey McWilliams</i>	234
Fiction in Review <i>by Diana Trilling</i>	236
Music <i>by B. H. Haggin</i>	237

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS 238

CROSSWORD PUZZLE No. 227 *by Mr. X* 239

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But while the Farben executives fight for their lives, no serious effort is being made to break up their cartel, or such other monster trusts as Siemens, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, or Mannesmann. In a remarkable speech in the House six weeks ago, Representative Sadowski of Michigan demonstrated in detail how "the leaders of German heavy industries and finance—staunch supporters of the Nazi regime—have retained full control of German economic life." And why not, with our Robert Murphy undermining the denazification program and all but repudiating the Potsdam agreement? With General Draper—a vice-president of Dillon, Read and Company, just appointed Under Secretary of War—openly working to rebuild the German steel trust which his firm had financed to the tune of \$125,000,000?

★

YEAR AFTER YEAR, THE NEWSPAPERS AND officials of some chosen city go through the routine of welcoming the American Legion, putting up with its dreary horse play, and sighing with relief when the middle-aged children pack up their water pistols, whistles, and electric sticks and go home. Out of gratitude to those legionnaires who really fought for the country—thousands of them, of course, never smelled enemy powder, while thousands who did would not be caught dead in a Legion uniform—we can easily endure a few days of synthetic carnival. But while the rank-and-file members are inanely engaged in dropping bags of water from hotel windows, their officers and exploiters indulge in more dangerous mischief. Last week, the Legion bureaucrats outdid themselves. The oratory to which they exposed their gullible charges was of the hysterical, if not incendiary, war-with-Russia variety. The speeches by Louis Johnson and General Eisenhower were the only conspicuous exceptions, and cautious as they were, the retiring Legion commander had the effrontery to try to head off Johnson's or force him to modify it. The product of official incitement and membership ignorance was a set of reports and resolutions that included the following principles: The Marshall plan is worth while solely as a dam against the Russians. The Soviet Union is to be condemned for sabotaging the United Nations by its free use of the veto, and we should strengthen the U. N. by rejecting all international controls over atomic energy. The Communist Party should be outlawed and the Bill of Rights amended to make easier the suppressing of subversive elements. "Socialistic" is the word for the Taft-Ellender-Wagner housing bill, but government housing cannot be ignored entirely; we must see that it is barred to members of un-American organizations. After reviewing this "serious work" of the Legion's officials, we almost respect the wholesome intelligence of the humble legionnaire whose sole convention business was to chase blondes up the street at the point of a fake red paintbrush.

America's Guilt in Britain's Crisis

[Uncle Sam is not Uncle Shylock. But his lack of political sophistication, his small-town bankers' view of economics and finance, his belligerent conviction that he is beholden to nobody, and his incapacity, born of the smug knowledge that he is today the Croesus of the world, to realize the plight of less fortunate people or to understand how their misfortune can possibly affect him often make him act like Uncle Shylock. And American behavior in the matter of aid to Britain and Europe is a tragic case in point.]

[In the nature of the case, it is hard for Americans to realize how their behavior looks to the rest of the world. They should—and for that reason, we reprint below sections from an article in the London Economist of August 23, which seems to us both perceptive and just.]

IT WOULD be wrong to say that American opinion as a whole is uninformed about the plight of Europe or insensitive to it. The State Department, some Congressmen, and the more responsible newspapers are anxious, sympathetic, and eager to discover some method by which the inconvenient legalities of the American Constitution can be circumvented and aid made available in time. It is a situation very similar to that of 1940-41. But, as at that time, it is the rest of American opinion that has to be reckoned with, and though there is less active hostility to Britain than at many times in the past—except among the Zionists, who probably do the British cause more good, on balance, than harm—there is equally less willingness to understand why any effort should be made to help.

Sir Wilfrid Eady has come up against a typical representative of this attitude in Mr. Snyder, the Missouri banker who found himself with some suddenness projected into the office of Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Snyder has declared himself to be sympathetic to the British case, but it has also been made clear that the sympathy is of the brand that a Missouri banker is accustomed to show to a borrower who has run through one loan and now requires both to be released from some of the conditions of that loan and granted a new one. The banker will sit and listen, but the onus of proof is on the borrower and the proof had better be a good one.

It would be a waste of time to try to explain to people with this psychological approach that the fault for the present crisis—if fault there must be—is far more America's than Britain's. The loan was far too small when it was made, as the British pointed out at the time. The conditions attached to it were unworkable, as was also pointed out at the time. The sharp reduction in the real value of the loan was due to the rise in American prices, following upon the abandonment of price control in America. The world-wide dollar crisis, which hurled the convertibility provision into a disaster, is due to the fact that the American balance of payments has got out of control. Nothing could have been done

about any of these things by any British action or inaction. Contributory negligence there has certainly been from the British side, but it has been of smaller importance . . .

American opinion should be warned that over here, in Great Britain, one has the feeling of being driven into a corner by a complex of American actions and insistencies which, in combination, are quite intolerable. Not many people in this country believe the Communist thesis that it is the deliberate and conscious aim of American policy to ruin Britain and everything that Britain stands for in the world. But the evidence can certainly be read that way. And if, every time that aid is extended, conditions are attached which make it impossible for Britain ever to escape the necessity of going back for still more aid, obtained with still more self-abasement and on still more crippling terms, then the result will certainly be what the Communists predict, whether or not it is what the Americans intend. The crippling of the British export trades that was one of the conditions of Lend-Lease increased the dimensions of the aid that was required in 1945. And the famous Articles VII to X of the loan agreement, with their obligations of convertibility and non-discrimination, have brought the British back to Washington earlier and in worse plight than was necessary.

IS IT really the Americans' wish that this process should continue? They should be warned that, every time it is repeated, something more is subtracted from the British willingness to offer genuine cooperation in building the sort of world that Americans want. Do they really prefer a resentful dependency to a self-supporting and self-respecting friend? They should realize that the British government has made very great efforts, and has been willing to run great risks, in agreeing with American conceptions of international economic policy. The risks of convertibility have proved all too real. Non-discrimination, if it is applied in the months to come, will be the means of starving the British people. Yet even now, at Geneva, the British representatives are in process of committing this country, in the proposed charter of the International Trade Organization, to sweeping general principles which, however excellent they may be in theory, are likely to prove in practice to be equally dangerous. No government could have put more of its own interests in pawn to pledge its good-will; no other government has even tried to make a similar effort. Yet those who would search in Washington for the credit that Britain has earned thereby would need the patience of Diogenes.

For the present, the Americans still retain the power to make the British government jump through any hoop they choose. For it is the ultimate calamity that, for all the brave talk of standing on our own feet, the misfortunes that would fall upon the British people if there were no dollars at all are such that no British government could face them. But this dependence will not last forever. A time will come when, by a combination of external events and internal efforts, Britain will be able to do without dollars at a cost that will be bearable. Do the Americans, when that time comes, want the British to regard the cutting loose from America, the erection of barriers against America, as a boon so great that the highest bearable price will be cheerfully

paid for it at the earliest possible moment? They can be assured that there are very many Englishmen who would regard anything of the sort as an unparalleled disaster, as the final and irremediable losing of the peace that so much common blood and treasure were spent to win. But they can also be assured that that is the way things are drifting at present.

Mr. Marshall, in his great speech at Harvard in June, called on the European nations for a great imaginative effort. They are responding, and in a more far-reaching way than might have been expected. In return, Europeans have the right to ask the Americans to make an equally great effort of imagination. Let them forget, for the moment, their own conviction that their present wealth and strength are the result of superior virtue and remember the Europeans' conviction that they are merely due to better luck. Let them worry less about what they can afford to give and more about what they cannot afford not to give. Let them above all try to realize what it feels like to be in other men's shoes.

The Palestine Report

FROM the moment it was appointed, the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine was condemned to do exactly what it did—produce recommendations none of the parties interested would willingly accept. The first reactions of Jews and Arabs are critical; those of the Jews in varying degree, those of the Arabs unanimously and without qualification. As we write, the British have said nothing, officially, but their objections are not hard to predict.

The Nation also differs with the report at several important points, particularly on the question of area and borders. Just the same, we believe both sets of recommendations prepared for the General Assembly are distinguished by a high degree of fairness and objectivity. Whether or not they are adopted by the Assembly, whether or not, if adopted, they are agreed to by the British and carried into effect, they represent an honest, intelligent attempt to find a way out of one of the nastiest dilemmas of our time. Above all, they show remarkable freedom from the constraints of power politics. Clearly, the problem was considered on its merits and not in terms of the special interests of one or another great power. That in itself is an achievement.

We favor the majority report, proposing two separate states linked by a common economic council, over that of the minority, which favors a bi-national federal union of Jewish and Arab states. Ideally, the second sounds more desirable; in a society where race and religion played a less destructive role, a bi-national Palestine would be an obvious democratic solution. But in a society divided by communal interests and sharply conflicting ways of life, a federal state such as the minority members suggest could not be trusted to protect the vital interests of Palestine's Jews. Under this scheme, the con-

trol of foreign relations and taxation and, above all, of immigration would be left to the central government. But the legislative, administrative, and judicial structure proposed would assure representatives of the Arab majority the final word on all federal matters. When one reflects on the solid, unbending opposition of every organized Arab faction to the admission to Palestine of a single additional Jew, and on the attitude of the Arab Higher Committee toward even the existing Jewish population, one can easily imagine the decisions a federal Palestine government would reach on questions of immigration and the protection and development of Jewish institutions. We do not doubt the good intention of Iran, India, and Yugoslavia, the creators of this plan, but we believe their recommendations should be rejected.

THE constitutional provisions proposed by the majority are interesting and, at first look, thoroughly realistic. They take account of the need and desire of both peoples for genuine sovereign powers, while recognizing the absolute necessity for common economic arrangements. Under the majority plan, drawn up by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay, the two Palestinian states would be quite separate in structure and political powers, but they would subscribe in advance to a treaty creating an economic union. The functions of the union would be to establish a customs union, a common currency, operation of transportation and ports; also to promote "joint economic development especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation, and soil conservation." The economic board to be set up under the plan would have as members three representatives each of the Jewish and Arab states and "three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations." In this provision lies the promise of a future prosperous Palestine, capable not only of absorbing many hundred thousands of homeless Jews but of providing a human standard of life for the Arab masses as well.

The political proposals in the majority plan are similar to many that have been made by earlier advocates of partition, including those in the memorandum submitted to the assembly last April by the Nation Associates. They provide for democratic procedures in the election of constituent assemblies in both states (including suffrage for women!) and insist upon democratic safeguards in the constitutions to be written. They take particular care of the citizenship rights of members of the minority group in each state, insuring them the chance to "opt" for citizenship in the other state if they prefer it. But the constitutional details of the plan are less important than its broad outlines, geographical as well as political.

Without question, the commission tried to fix boundaries that met the minimum requirements of both peoples. By and large, it succeeded pretty well; at certain critical

points it failed. Arab leaders are not talking about what they like and what they dislike, since they are committed against the whole scheme. Just the same, the inclusion of Jaffa in the Jewish area must have been a particularly painful jolt, for Jaffa is, in effect, the Arab capital of Palestine, the center of Arab urban life. Under Jewish authority, it could well be a focus of trouble. Apart from this, the Arabs received all they could rationally claim in a divided state.

The Jews did not. They argued for the inclusion of western Galilee, partly because it contains many flourishing Jewish colonies and is geographically part of the coastal area assigned to the Jewish state; partly because it reaches up to and borders upon Lebanon. Close relations between Jewish Palestine and Christian Lebanon are most desirable. In spite of Lebanon's resistance to Zionist claims in the United States, its long-range interests unquestionably lie with the growth of a vigorous Jewish community, able to resist—and help Lebanon to resist—the pressure of the Moslem majority in the Levant. To establish an almost detached wedge of Arab Palestine between Lebanon and the Jewish state is, in our opinion, a serious mistake.

On the other hand, the commission showed independence as well as good sense in allotting the Negev to the Jews. This arid, almost empty area, forbidding to the ordinary settler, represents one of the pioneering dreams of Jewish Palestine. Several colonies have already been planted there, and others will come as fast as land is made available. But the large-scale development of the great sandy triangle as a productive area capable of sustaining a settled population will depend upon the building of a Jordan Valley project to provide power and water. If the Negev is finally included in a Jewish state, the British will have lost an important future base for military installations outside, but adjacent to, Egypt. For this reason, among several others, it is not likely that Britain's delegates at the Assembly will welcome the commission's majority recommendations.

THE other reasons are large and obvious. Whether or not Britain wants to find a way to withdraw from Palestine—and most close observers believe it does not—it can hardly enjoy being asked by an international commission to get out. Point 1 of the unanimous recommendations that open the report calls for the ending of the mandate at the earliest "practicable" moment. Point 4 would permit Britain to continue to administer Palestine "during the transitional period" under authority of the United Nations, a rather dubious privilege in view of Points 2 and 3, which call for independence for Palestine after a brief period of preparation, and of the majority suggestion that 150,000 Jewish immigrants be admitted to the proposed Jewish state at a regular monthly rate of 30,000—beginning right away. To administer Pales-

tine on these terms would be like assisting at one's own wake, and Britain is not likely to jump at the chance. If Bevin feels forced to acquiesce in the general scheme of independence and partition, he will surely demand help, presumably from America, in liquidating his country's power under conditions of which he violently disapproves. The most one can expect is that he will live up to his promise to accept unanimous recommendations, which means at least accepting the end of the mandate; beyond this, one can only hope. To Bevin, Palestine is not India; it is a strategic area he wants to hold on to, in spite of past promises to a people he doesn't much like under any circumstances. Bevin's admitted anti-Semitism may yet be a factor to be reckoned with.

In any case, the idea of keeping Britain on the job as administering power while the new states are being defined and set up seems to us thoroughly impractical. British rule in Palestine is discredited in the eyes of the world and detested by both Arabs and Jews. A far better plan would be the one proposed in the Nation Associates memorandum: to withdraw the mandate from Britain and place Palestine under the direct authority of the United Nations with the protection of an international police force, perhaps on the Trieste model since no permanent United Nations force has been agreed upon.

The Arab position is settled. No bargaining or cajoling—far less, reasoning—is going to affect it. If either plan is adopted, it will have to be imposed upon the Arab leaders in Palestine and upon the Arab states which have made the Palestine case their own. Persons who shrink from an imposed decision should recall that no modification or compromise will produce agreement; the Arabs themselves have officially made that clear.

The Jewish position is uncertain. Moderate Zionists seem inclined to accept the majority proposals with certain specific qualifications. The more extreme elements, who have opposed partition right along, will undoubtedly raise many arguable objections. In the end, Jewish approval is likely, except among the terrorist fringe, if only because the alternative is a future of endless, destructive struggle—and further unthinkable misery for the refugees. The voyage of the *Exodus* will help rally Jews to the commission's plan.

What about the United States? The attitude of this country may be decisive in the U. N. even though it is not a primary "party in interest." For months, as Thomas J. Hamilton points out on page 219, the State Department has been pretending that we have no policy on Palestine—despite a generation of firm commitments. Oil and Russia have intervened to throw doubt on American honesty and steadfastness, but the commission's report will put the Administration's intentions to an early test. A strong voice from the country may help to crystallize them.

Politics and People

BY ROBERT BENDINER

[With this column we introduce a new feature by Robert Bendiner, intended to keep our readers posted on the ways and wiles of politicians as the country heads toward the quadrennial spasm of a Presidential election. People and Politics will appear at frequent intervals from now to November, 1948.]

SUCH are the palates of politicians that no words of their own are ever too bitter to swallow. Senator Pepper, who for at least a year has not been noticeably kinder than the Republican National Committee in his references to President Truman, now finds him not merely sincere, honest, and humane, but the very "salt of the earth." And A. F. Whitney, blandly supporting Truman for reelection, is in no visible way embarrassed by the fact that only last summer he pledged himself to raise a million dollars to defeat the President who had smashed the railroad strike, the man about whom he delighted in telling the kind of off-shade stories that Westchester commuters once told of Roosevelt as they rode to work on the "Assassination Special." But Pepper, as an associate of mine neatly puts it, is always to be taken with a grain of salt; and Whitney's ire, largely personal in its inspiration, faded out with the issues that roused it.

There are others, however, for whom an about-face will not be so simple, and some for whom it will hardly be possible. The Communists and many who follow them, even at a respectable distance, are guided exclusively by considerations of foreign policy. To them the man who promulgated the Truman Doctrine regained not an inch of stature by vetoing the Taft-Hartley bill. And in foreign policy there is no apparent prospect of a change that they can regard favorably. One of the more speculative aspects of the Presidential campaign, therefore, will be the course chosen by these anti-Trumanites, who are neither impelled to reverse themselves for reasons of domestic policy, as Whitney did, nor committed, like Pepper, to the Democratic Party, right or wrong, win or lose.

THAT these voters will find solace in a third party of national dimensions becomes every week less probable. Actually their hope was doomed when Philip Murray turned a deaf ear, thus depriving them of the use of the C. I. O.'s Political Action Committee as a spearhead. Murray's position has now been made clear beyond all doubt by David J. McDonald, his lieutenant in the Steel Workers' Union and secretary-treasurer of P. A. C. "The drive for labor goals," Mr. McDonald says flatly,

"will be made through the established parties." Without the C. I. O., without the A. F. of L., which was never counted on, and without the Railway Brotherhoods, which were, the campaigners for a third party in 1948 are left nursing an empty threat and pondering a nice dilemma. If they persist in following a mirage, they either isolate themselves from labor or divide its ranks; and if they abandon the idea, what choice have they but to back Truman against a probably worse opponent?

For the moment the course appears to be one of playing down the third-party Presidential talk altogether. When the subject recently threatened to produce in New York's American Labor Party one of those amoeba-like divisions that characterize leftist politics, the Communists immediately relaxed their pressure. Reaction, the party's state secretary lamely explained in the *Daily Worker*, "is attempting to identify the third-party movement in New York and elsewhere solely with the prospects of a third Presidential ticket in 1948, and on this issue is attempting to divide and disintegrate the natural adherents and supporters of the third-party trend." The Communists, he indicated, were ready to subordinate the issue to the larger ones of preserving the unity of the A. L. P. and building nationally for the future. Even taking this explanation at its face value—always an unwarranted course in politics—it appears that the comrades are resigned to forgetting the notion of Wallace in '48. And if they have given up, it is not far-fetched to imagine that the Progressive Citizens' Committee, left to itself, will quietly drop the idea before long.

DOES this mean that disaffected Democrats will creep back to the Truman camp? Probably. But two other possibilities are still open. First, they might choose to ignore the Presidential campaign entirely and confine their activities to the Congressional races. In the event that Dewey or Taft is the Republican nominee, it would be understood, probably, that Truman was to be preferred and voted for, but enthusiasm for him would be kept to the level reserved in politics for Lesser Evils.

An alternative is one that the Republicans themselves ironically might provide, to wit, the nomination of General Eisenhower. It would be rash to anticipate the reaction of the left to such a move, and I make no predictions, but it would be foolish to ignore the possibilities. Eisenhower sentiment has not yet reached the boom stage, and it may never do so, but it is unquestionably growing, and all the faster because of the likelihood of a Dewey-Taft deadlock at the convention. Ike-for-President buttons have bobbed up in various parts of the country, and Wall Street money is reported to be quietly slipping away from Dewey and moving in the direction of the General, whose publicity grows steadily in volume.

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Time

A Gallup poll last week showed that 35 per cent of those questioned would like to see Eisenhower run, which is startling when one recalls that in earlier polls not more than 4 per cent of Republicans and 6 per cent of Democrats ever mentioned him when asked to make a choice for 1948.

THE pertinent aspect of the Eisenhower build-up is that it originated in labor circles. The inspiration was Sidney Hillman's, acquired in the course of his last trip to Europe, and the idea began headway at the 1946 convention of the C. I. O. Eisenhower, as guest of honor, made a notably favorable impression. Not only did he eulogize labor in general, which is standard operating procedure for men in public life, but he spoke warmly of the "benefits that have been brought to the American working people" specifically by the trade unions. He had already pleased the left by telling audiences here and

in Europe that he was "convinced that no major nation in the world wants a global war," but this has probably been canceled out by the sharp references to Russia's free use of the veto which he made in the course of his speech to the American Legion. Many delegates at the C. I. O. convention read significance into Murray's carefully enunciated farewell to the General. "Every man and woman in this hall," he said, to great and prolonged applause, "is a friend of yours."

Of course that was before Truman had preempted the Democratic nomination and before the Republicans had revealed themselves to the country in all their legislative glory. As a Democratic nominee Eisenhower would sweep in the union vote, but to ask labor to support him as a Republican, with all the political baggage he would necessarily carry along with him, would admittedly put an appalling strain on the friendship proclaimed by Mr. Murray.

Washington and the United Nations

BY THOMAS J. HAMILTON

Lake Success, September 2

WHETHER it is because of the ineptness of Soviet diplomacy or for the more fundamental reason that Soviet aims are incompatible with a peaceful and orderly world, the United States will play an even more important role at the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly than heretofore. In particular, the Soviet attitude toward the Balkan problem, which is likely to be the most bitterly contested issue, has won friends and influenced people for the American side.

Considerations of *Realpolitik* are never overlooked in the most technical diplomatic conversation, and it would be unrealistic to disregard the fact that the United States is now not only the greatest military power but the only source of food and machinery for war-crippled countries. But new strength has been given to the American position by the succession of Soviet vetoes and by the general intransigence of Soviet officials at Lake Success and everywhere else that the Soviet Union is in contact with the outside world.

The United States is therefore able to raise a standard around which the wise and honest may rally. If it does so, it can completely dominate the meeting at Flushing Meadows. The permanent delegates are saying that this will be a critical session, that the future of the United Nations largely depends on it. The position taken by the United States on the principal issues therefore will be of

fundamental importance in determining whether the basis of an enduring peace can be laid.

The United States hardly lived up to its opportunities or its responsibilities at previous sessions of the General Assembly. A year ago, when the Assembly held its first meeting in this country, Mr. Molotov was allowed to take the initiative with his disarmament proposal. It was largely because of the efforts of better-briefed delegations, particularly the Canadian, that the resulting storm blew itself out in a resolution that at least did not jeopardize the work already done by the Atomic Energy Commission. Other countries took the lead on such matters as the Franco regime in Spain and the discrimination against Indians in South Africa, and the American delegation found itself in a position where it could soften but not hold up the resolutions that gave mortal offense to Franco and Marshal Smuts.

On the other hand, although the Assembly was hard-put to keep up with the astonishing reversals of position by Warren R. Austin, the chief United States representative, it followed through to the end on the site question, and accepted Mr. Rockefeller's offer of the East River location. Even more inexorably the United States held fast on the matter of supplying international relief after the liquidation of UNRRA, and Secretary General Trygve Lie was authorized to ascertain the need without being given the slightest means of doing anything about it.

At the special session on Palestine the leadership of the United States was noticeable mainly in a series of procedural maneuvers which somehow or other

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created the impression that we were sympathetic with the Arabs. We said nothing about President Truman's reiterated demands for the admission of 100,000 Jews, though we did not say anything particularly friendly to the Arabs either. We were not showing our hand, and neither were the Russians; so the Assembly managed to set up a committee of inquiry with relatively little difficulty. A panel suggested by the United States contained most of the countries placed on the committee. We declared we had no policy on Palestine and would not have any until the committee submitted its report. That gave us a delay of four months, but this reprieve is now coming to an end, and sooner or later the walls of the skating rink at Flushing Meadows will echo with a statement that will give mortal offense either to the Arab countries and the American oil companies doing business with them or to the pro-Zionist Jewish vote in the United States, or to both.

Partition now appears to be the best hope of settling the Palestine question, and Mr. Gromyko has already indicated that he would accept it as a last resort. It is apparently agreeable to the United States as well. If the committee of inquiry proposed the return of the twelve lost tribes to their former home, the General Assembly would acquiesce if both Washington and Moscow wanted it. No solution is conceivable unless the United States and the Soviet Union do agree.

Looking at the situation from the most hopeful point of view, the vital question now is what steps can be taken to carry out the General Assembly's recommendation. It is obvious that force must be used, and it is equally obvious that the United Nations has none at its command—even the long-talked-of "international police force" would be at the disposal of the Security Council, not of the Assembly. Judging from the recent fighting in Palestine, in which Arabs as well as Jews are now taking part, a major effort will be required.

The British have the only immediately available troops, and they are less and less inclined to carry the burdens of empire in the Mediterranean. In any case, they have made it clear that although they will *accept* any decision on Palestine by the General Assembly, they will not *carry out* any decision which does not square with their conscience and their means, or which is unacceptable to both sides. The British will certainly have an out if they choose to use it.

A FEW months ago, in the relatively halcyon days of the United Nations, it appeared that plans for the permanent headquarters would be the second outstanding problem. It is still a problem, although other and even more controversial issues have arisen. As for the site, it is obvious that the other members of the United Nations will find the greatest difficulty in supplying the dollars required for their share. Sixty-five million dollars, the latest revised estimate, is not much when it is

divided among fifty-five countries, but the accentuated austerity program in England is a fair indication of the foreign-exchange situation in many countries.

It may be that the undignified device of mortgaging the new buildings to Massachusetts insurance companies is the only way, though hard-boiled insurance men cannot be expected to put up the full amount. This seems to be the opinion of some of the members of Mr. Lie's high command, who obviously hope that such an example of self-help, if not thrift, will wring the heart of Mr. Taber and thereby bring an appropriation from the United States Congress for the remainder. The other alternatives are to get the United States to put up its entire share at once and perhaps lend the balance; to require the fifty-five member nations to come across with United States dollars in time to pay the contractors; to postpone—or abandon—the whole idea of a "workshop for peace" among the topless towers of Manhattan.

It is to be feared that dollar-poor members will raise niggling objections to the magnificent design prepared by Wallace K. Harrison and his international committee unless the United States delegation is able to offer generous financial support. Undeniable difficulties stand in the way of such an offer, for Congress is not in session, Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally will not serve as members of the delegation, and the State Department is justifiably cautious about committing the guardians of the nation's purse strings. On the other hand, the digging of foundations and the erection of steel girders for the permanent home of the United Nations would undoubtedly have a tonic effect on world opinion.

Already, of course, the less stout-hearted champions of collective security are beginning to say that they are afraid the United Nations will be mostly a debating society by the time the headquarters is built, if it is built.

THE last few weeks have certainly provided a field day for the pessimists. A succession of Soviet vetoes on the Balkan question and the related question of new members has left little of the principle of great-power unanimity. The fact that France invoked the veto on the Indonesian question was at least as damaging as any baker's dozen of Soviet vetoes, for it removed the notion prevalent among many that the veto is a diabolical Russian device which is eschewed by the four other right-thinking great powers. Until now these right-thinking countries have had the votes to block any resolution in the Security Council without having to rely on the veto. The French veto left many with the suspicion that even China, even Great Britain, and even the United States, might invoke it if things started getting tough for their side.

In any event, the veto question will be raised in various guises: in the report on the rejected applicants—ten this year, instead of the five of 1947; in the formal

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protest by the Perón regime against such an undemocratic device; and finally, and most serious of all, in the formal United States appeal to the General Assembly from the Soviet vetoes on the Balkan question. It is to be noted that the new United States proposals for defining the veto, if they mean anything at all, do not really limit its operation on important questions. They even confirm the use of the veto on all matters arising out of Chapter VI—matters that threaten peace—as well as out of Chapter VII, which applies to shooting wars. Nevertheless, the United States very clearly means business in the Balkan situation, even though the General Assembly, equally clearly, has the power to make recommendations only, not to give orders binding upon all members of the United Nations.

Some delegates think the United States will have trouble in getting the required two-thirds' majority for Assembly recommendations on the Balkans. But it is to be hoped that the State Department is giving the necessary consideration to the steps to be taken if the Assembly accepts the United States resolution, and the Soviet-dominated countries of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria refuse to pay any attention to it. Mr. Johnson has already suggested that in such a case we would invoke Article 51 of the Charter, which authorizes both individual and collective action for self-defense pending action by the Security Council. It seems obvious that this is a dangerous policy, however necessary it may be to prevent the Communist coup which the State Department still anticipates as an answer to the Truman doctrine.

The threat seems to be part of a full-scale diplomatic offensive that the United States has launched in the United Nations in the past few weeks. We are now giving blow for blow, and every now and then Mr. Johnson lets Mr. Gromyko have one for old times even when the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister is apparently just looking at his shoestrings. These tactics no doubt will be continued and stiffened when the interest shifts from Lake Success to Flushing Meadows. There is every reason to welcome more adequate statements of the American point of view, which certainly have been deficient in contrast with the arguments *ad hominem* of the Kremlin's representatives. But it seems worth reminding our delegation that the United Nations organization, imperfect though it certainly is, is based on the hope that prevailed at San Francisco for cooperation among the great powers, and specifically between the United States and the Soviet Union. If the other countries are forced to choose, an overwhelming majority will certainly take our side. With respect to the issue of the creation of a Balkan border commission, our side is obviously right. But it is to be hoped that the United States delegation will ponder the results of a series of victories that might leave the United Nations unalterably divided into two camps. If the United Nations can weather this meeting of the General Assembly without a marked loss in prestige, it can look forward to a healthy future, but it is still too young to survive a decisive contest. Perhaps if the showdown is postponed, and if the peace treaties can be written before the 1948 Assembly convenes, no showdown will be necessary.

Crisis for British Labor

BY AYLMER VALLANCE

London, August 20

TO PEOPLE who, like your correspondent, have lived through the past half-century there is something disquieting in fine weather over England. The sky was cloudless when a defeated British army reeled back from Mons; over London the days and nights were halcyon as Hitler's armored divisions drove across Poland; and this August a cloudless heaven has given England unbroken sunshine while a crisis has developed which threatens not only next winter's food rations but something much more important—the success of Mr. Attlee's government and the whole future of British Social Democracy. As the sunlit weeks have passed, the question to emerge has been not so much whether Britain's Ship of State has a compass as whether it has a rudder.

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The story begins with the private meeting of the Parliamentary Labor Party on July 30. M. P.'s assembled for that meeting in considerable disquiet. It had become clear that the dollar loan would be exhausted earlier than the most pessimistic had predicted; it was not understood why Mr. Dalton—flying, it was said, in the face of United States Treasury advice to the contrary—had gone ahead with plans to make sterling on current account convertible as from July 15 in spite of the mounting drain on the dollar credit; and there had been a spate of rumors, sedulously fomented by the Tory press, that the Prime Minister intended to form a coalition government and appeal to the country on that basis for a mandate. From the meeting, however, sufficient news ran the gauntlet of parliamentary privilege and appeared in the press to make it clear that Ministers had assured their supporters that the crisis would be tackled resolutely and on Socialist lines. Mr. Attlee appears to have forestalled attacks from the "Keep Left" group

by promising a drastic scaling down of the armed forces; and the keynote of his speech, forecasting the program to be laid before Parliament, was that there would be no whittling down of socialist policy and that Britain would seek at all costs greater economic independence from the United States.

A week passed, a week in which the Cabinet met and met again. The press gave the crisis a tremendous build-up: ruthless economies in imports were forecast; a real siege economy was to be enacted; there was to be no more temporizing with the problem of dollar scarcity; unparalleled sacrifices were to be demanded all around. Newspaper readers really sat up and took notice: there was something of the Dunkirk temper in the atmosphere. But when Mr. Attlee announced the government's crisis plan in Parliament on August 6, it became only too clear that the series of Cabinet meetings had witnessed not the final formulation of a logical, precise program for dealing with the emergency but the reassertion by Ernest Bevin of his fatal supremacy over his colleagues. Contrary to what the Parliamentary Labor Party had been led to believe, no radical modification in Britain's costly foreign policy or its commitments abroad was indicated: a derisory cut of 80,000 in the strength of the services was all that Mr. Attlee promised for the next six months, and it appeared that by the end of 1948 there would still be the economically intolerable total of 840,000 in "uniformed unemployment."

The shock administered to government supporters on the back benches was profound; and the rest of the government's program only increased the bewilderment. Faced with a deficit of at least £700,000,000 in Britain's balance of foreign payments, Mr. Attlee gave no sign that a serious attempt would be made to bridge the gap. There were to be, it is true, some fresh austerities—a 12 per cent cut in the number of points available for the purchase of certain non-rationed foods, a mild reduction in petrol allowances, and a stiff tax on imported films. By these cuts and by letting stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials run down during the next twelve months perhaps the foreign-payments' gap might be narrowed by £200,000,000. But what of the balance of £500,000,000? Mr. Attlee had no suggestions to offer beyond expressing the hope that the coal and steel industries would attain higher production and that by the end of next year we should be exporting half as much again as we are today. In key industries, he hoped, longer hours would be worked; and he spoke encouragingly if vaguely of the possibility of taking steps to correct the present maldistribution of labor as between essential and unessential occupations. Parliament was left with the impression that it had been presented with a hastily gathered bagful of improvisations.

The immediate consequence was a memorial to the Prime Minister from Labor M. P.'s of all shades of opin-

ion demanding another meeting of the Parliamentary Labor Party before Parliament dispersed for the recess. That meeting was held on August 11, by which time the House of Commons—the Lords subsequently assenting—had given the government the widest possible powers to deal with the crisis by means of administrative decree. What Labor M. P.'s wanted to know was whether the government intended in fact to make use of the powers accorded it. Above all, had the Cabinet really said its last word about the possibility of service retrenchment, and were the patently ineffective measures so far announced for dealing with the economic crisis to be regarded simply as a piece of window-dressing paraded in the hope that the United States Treasury would be sufficiently impressed to provide further dollar credits in anticipation of Congressional approval? And, if so, did this mean that part of the price to be paid would be the shelving of the promised bill to nationalize the steel industry in Britain and the indorsement of American plans to revitalize the heavy industries of the Ruhr on the basis of private enterprise? The party appears to have got a dusty answer. They were told that the size of the armed forces would be kept constantly under review; that it was for the Cabinet to decide if and when the steel industry should be brought under social control; and that nothing could be said at present about coming negotiations in Washington with reference to the future of Germany. "Have we a policy?" one Labor M. P. asked another as they left the meeting. "Have we a government?" was the retort.

The crack is, in one sense, unfair: the government is functioning, and from a strictly departmental point of view is functioning efficiently enough. What is missing is a coordinated plan stated simply and intelligibly so as to evoke a positive response from the common people. That such a response would be given to an appeal couched in clear terms is beyond doubt. Even as it is, the miners have agreed in principle to work longer hours, and the General Council of the Trade Union Congress is raising no objection to the proposal that labor should be directed into undermanned key industries—a proposal which Mr. Churchill attacked with extravagant vehemence last week-end. The trouble is that too many people realize that the measures which the government proposes are at best a half-hearted compromise. For example, the plan for the direction of labor is apparently to apply only to men and women who become unemployed; that is, before essential industries can be provided with "directed" recruits from unessential industries, the latter will have to be gradually slowed down by being given smaller quotas of fuel and raw materials—a slow process which can do little to reduce employment in wasteful occupations, such as the betting industry and the host of middle-men transactions, in which raw materials are not a relevant factor.

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Compromises are not a spur to individual effort, least of all when the ultimate objective is not clearly discerned, and complete uncertainty about where we are going is beginning to impair both the nation's will to work and the morale of the Labor Party. The impression is universal that a great opportunity to rouse the country in support of a dramatic five-year plan has been lost, and that a divided Cabinet cannot yet make up its mind whether Britain's economy is to be geared to Wall Street or whether we must abandon hopes of multilateral trade expansion and seek outside the dollar area countries whose specific needs we can supply in return for the food and raw materials we cannot do without. At the moment bewilderment at the government's apparent complacency, mixed with vague apprehension that every month the situation is going to get more and more out of control, is leading to a sense of frustration and to cynicism.

August 29, by Cable

THE developments of the past weeks have done nothing toward modifying the impression that the Cabinet is prisoner to adverse circumstances and hopelessly deficient in a positive policy. Stopping the convertibility of sterling was an inevitable reaction to the grossly underestimated drain on dollar resources after July 15. Significantly, Eady, according to Snyder, did not ask for an American waiver to Article 9, which suggests that

the Cabinet is unable to face the implications of the breakdown of multilateralism and is reluctant to risk American displeasure by developing discriminatory but vitally essential new avenues for British trade with the dominions and Europe.

The ban on pleasure motoring and travel abroad, announced last night, adds only £30,000,000 to foreign-exchange savings as previously published, leaving a two-thirds' gap which still has to be bridged. Public opinion is increasingly disquieted by the likelihood that a negative policy on import restrictions will be continued and is reacting adversely to foreign ability to purchase British exports, such as motors. Both the left and the right press are universally hostile and deplore the absence of any constructive proposals to increase production.

This is particularly regrettable in the coal industry. The miners' offer to work every Saturday was rejected by the government on the unconvincing excuse of inability to afford payment for the overtime; it preferred to substitute eight hours for seven and a half on Monday and Friday. Rightly or wrongly the miners believe this proposal, which admittedly is less efficacious in terms of increased output, represents the first step, as dictated by the United States, toward the permanent abandonment of the seven-and-a-half-hour day and the subsequent enforcement of a forty-eight-hour week. The suspicion is causing bitterness in the coal fields and prejudicing the chances of a voluntary increase in effort.

Is the Constitution Un-American?

BY I. F. STONE

THE pro-fascist character of the Congressional Un-American Activities Committee was best displayed in the contempt proceedings against the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. In other cases of this kind fundamental issues have been obscured by divisions of opinion about the nature of the Communist Party and of Communist activity; the pro-fascist bias of the Dies committee and its successors has generally been covert and implicit. In the action against the J. A. F. R. C., however, the motives, the purposes, and the philosophy of the Un-American Activities Committee have been explicitly affirmed by the committee itself.

The committee's attack on the J. A. F. R. C. began with its inquiry into the anti-Franco rally held at Madison Square Garden on September 24, 1945. The committee's report of June 7, 1946, the outgrowth of that inquiry, is largely devoted to exposing "the lies and deceptions used by the Spanish front organizations . . . to create in the minds of the people of America the impression that the streets of Spain are covered with blood." The report operates on a familiar non-sequitur: the Communists are

against Franco; therefore to be against Franco is to be Communist. It equates opposition to Spanish fascism with un-Americanism. A Congressional committee presumably established to expose alien propaganda against American free government has succeeded thereby in jailing for contempt Americans accused of engaging in propaganda against a totalitarianism regime in Spain! In the annals of American politics there is no clearer case of indecent exposure.

The attack the report made on Harold Laski may serve to indicate how far the committee has wandered. Laski, at that time chairman of the British Labor Party, was stigmatized for a broadcast address to the anti-Franco rally: the committee objected to his criticism of the Vatican and to his opposition to a monarchist restoration. Adopting the subtle language of Union Square controversialists, it said censoriously that Laski "poses as a Marxian Socialist." A person who reads this report for some guidance on what the Un-American Activities Committee regards as un-American may reasonably conclude that it is un-American to criticize the political

activities of the Vatican or to pretend to be—presumably without being—"a Marxian Socialist." Here we find Dies's successors, Comrades Thomas, Rankin, and Adamson, deep in the heart of the dialectic.

THE sequence of events in this case is typical of the Un-American Committee's methods. On December 1, 1945, Ernie Adamson, counsel of the committee, asked the President's War Relief Control Board to cancel the license of the J. A. F. R. C. to collect and distribute funds for the relief of Spanish Republican refugees abroad—the committee's custom is to sentence first and investigate afterward. Seven days after making the demand, Adamson sent the J. A. F. R. C. a letter suggesting "that you permit one of our investigators to make a preliminary investigation of your organization to determine whether or not this committee *is interested in your activities*" (my italics). A few days later the committee, without benefit of this preliminary inquiry, issued a subpoena asking Miss Helen Bryan, executive secretary of the J. A. F. R. C., to bring all its books, records, papers, and documents to Washington; the list of contributors and the names of all receiving help from the committee were specifically requested. The J. A. F. R. C. objected to this on various practical and legal grounds: that the transfer would stop its work; that the disclo-

sure of contributors would subject them to character assassination by the Un-American Activities Committee; that to give out communications from Spanish Republicans in exile might mean death for their families in Spain.

Miss Bryan is to be tried under a separate indictment. The other sixteen members of the board have been tried and convicted. Five have purged themselves of contempt; eleven have been sentenced to serve from three to six months in jail and to pay fines of from \$500 to \$1,000. The convicted include the distinguished novelist Howard Fast; Lyman R. Bradley, who has been removed as chairman of the German Department at New York University; and Edward K. Barsky, chairman of the J. A. F. R. C., whose work as a doctor on the Loyalist side during the Franco rebellion will be honorably remembered by a future free Spain. Former Assistant Attorney General O. John Rogge is counsel for the convicted, and the case is now on appeal. It is one of a number of cases headed for the United States Supreme Court which will test, in legal and constitutional terms, the authority of the Un-American Activities Committee. A court test of this kind has been long overdue, and success in defying the committee would be a major victory for civil liberties. The Un-American Activities Committee is the John the Baptist of American fascism, and it has already cowed a large section of Congress and of public opinion.



SENTENCES imposed for contempt on the directors of the J. A. F. R. C., as on Eugene Dennis and Gerhart Eisler, have increased the committee's power to terrorize. The nature of these cases has created fears and nourished illusions which enable the committee to enlarge its area of political persecution with a minimum of public protest. Because these and pending cases involve either Communists or organizations within the Communist sphere of influence most liberals have been (1) wistfully hopeful that only reds and fellow-travelers are endangered, and (2) unmistakably fearful of defending the accused lest this be taken as evidence of Communist sympathies. One need only recall the committee's attack on the non-Communist and anti-Communist Union for Democratic Action, predecessor of the equally chaste Americans for Democratic Action, to see that the hope is hollow and the fear dangerous.

Effective protest and action are further paralyzed by the notion that nothing can be done about the abuses of so important a function of government as Congressional investigation. This is not true. "We are concerned here," Rogge said in his brief on motion to dismiss, "with the basic democratic right to be free from intimidation with reference to one's personal beliefs." There are ways of protecting that right in the courts. The Congressional power of investigation is not unlimited. A Congressional investigating committee is limited by the terms of the resolution which created it. The terms of the resolution must be within the powers of Congress, and those powers must be exercised within the framework of constitutional injunction as to fair procedure. "Neither house," the Supreme Court said in 1927, "is invested with 'general' power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures . . . a witness rightfully may refuse to answer where the bounds of the power are exceeded." Subpoenas cannot be so sweeping as to provide for fishing expeditions. "It is contrary to the first principles of justice," Holmes once ruled, "to allow a search through all the respondent's records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up." These quotations indicate the nature of some of the questions raised on appeal. Can a committee set up to investigate "un-American propaganda activities in the United States" fish in the private papers of an anti-fascist relief committee on the ground that aid to Franco's opponents and victims is un-American? The resolution setting up the Un-American Activities Committee is broad, far too broad for safety, but it is not that broad.

IF the J. A. F. R. C., was carrying on improper activities, the government had ample remedies at its disposal. The J. A. F. R. C.'s books and financial records were exhaustively examined by the Treasury last year; it was liable to loss of tax exemption if carrying on propaganda or otherwise misusing its funds. That the

J. A. F. R. C., retains its tax exemption indicates that nothing damaging was uncovered. If this did not satisfy the law-enforcement agencies of the government, they could summon a grand jury at any time and subpoena all the J. A. F. R. C.'s records. But in such a proceeding secrecy would protect the J. A. F. R. C.'s contributors and relief clients from unfair attack and unwarranted exposure. Grand-jury proceedings also protect the government from making a fool of itself as it did in the Eisler case, where an atom-bomb-spy scare fizzled out into conviction on tenuous passport technicalities.

One of the questions raised on appeal in both the J. A. F. R. C. and the Dennis case* is whether a Congressional investigating committee can properly assume the functions of a grand jury with a roving commission for the prosecution of crime. Wigmore's classic work on evidence says of the power of a legislative committee to compel testimony: "Not only does the logic of the legislative needs call for a strict limitation of this power, but also the policy of the situation; for the legislatures are not bound by, do not employ, the evidential rules that in judicial trials protect parties and witnesses and check abuses of power." Moreover, Wigmore continues, "legislative inquiries are sometimes conducted for partisan purposes and personal aggrandizement, and there is a particular temptation to pursue the inquiry beyond the necessities of contemplated legislation and to assume improperly the function of a grand jury." The impact of the committee's abuses in this respect may for the moment affect only a vulnerable faction of the left; the issue itself is basic and the abuses easily extensible.

THE J. A. F. R. C. was convicted under a statute which makes it a misdemeanor for a witness before a Congressional inquiry to refuse "to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry." But what is the "question under inquiry" by the Un-American Activities Committee? Un-American activities. But what are un-American activities? "The law," the New York *Times* once said editorially, "defines crime against the state and persons committing such crimes as admittedly un-American. But is it un-American to hold an unpopular opinion or take an attitude that is also held or taken by the Communists? . . . Had he [Dies] pushed his

* The Dennis affair was a less than exemplary demonstration in the dignity and decorum of free government. The Un-American Activities Committee scheduled public hearings last March on two bills to outlaw the Communist Party, but at first declined to hear Eugene Dennis, the general secretary. When Dennis finally won the right to appear, he was not allowed to testify against the bills and was put off the witness stand after a twenty-minute wrangle over why he had changed his paternal name, Waldron, to his mother's name, Dennis. Later the committee subpoenaed Dennis, but this time he refused to appear, challenged the legal authority of the committee, and was cited for contempt. The trial elicited the embarrassing information that J. Parnell Thomas, chairman of the committee, had also changed his name in early manhood, taking his mother's name of Thomas; the chairman was born J. Parnell Feeney. This, in Ireland, might well be considered subversive, though it was difficult to see the relevance of either change to an American Congressional inquiry.

opinion to a logical end, more than one-half of the population of the United States might have been denounced." The resolution creating the committee sets up no ascertainable standard of guilt; after ten years no one yet knows just what the committee considers "un-American."

A study in the April, 1947, issue of the *Columbia Law Review* points out that one threatening letter by Ernie Adamson, counsel to the committee, "intimates that harping on 'democracy' may be considered suspicious behavior." The vanished minority of the Dies committee which protested against the attack on the U. D. A. contended unsuccessfully for "the right of loyal American citizens to disagree politically with a majority of the Dies committee without being branded as subversive and un-American." The resolution as applied provides a dragnet for the punishment by public obloquy and contempt proceedings of anyone who holds opinions with which the committee disagrees. In such a context investigation becomes a new form of inquisition, and thus a committee of Congress may substantially, if obliquely, restrict fundamental liberties of thought and expression. "The harassing effect on political dissidents of an inquisition like that undertaken by the committee," says the *Columbia Law Review*, "has been noted. Patently, if it is well known that expressing novel political ideas and advocating certain types of change in government frequently subject individuals to burdensome investigation and disparaging publicity, many persons might . . . refrain from such activity. . . . Since the First Amendment protects against the infringement of the rights of

free speech and press by executive, judicial, or legislative action, any attempt to curb these rights in the guise of a Congressional investigation may also be illegal."

THE purpose of legislative inquiry is to provide the knowledge essential to legislation. But an inquiry into political ideas can have only a limited expression in legislation without running athwart the Bill of Rights. The point is clear if transplanted to a less controversial sphere. Congress is forbidden by the Constitution to set up an established church or to interfere with religious freedom. Could a Congressional investigating committee summon Baptists, Jews, or Catholics before it for theological examination? Could it use the excuse of the international character of the Vatican to harass Roman Catholics in their religious activities? How far can Congress go in exercising the power of investigation in a field where the power of legislation is severely limited? Can Congress use the power of investigation to restrict fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Constitution? The only parallel in Anglo-American legal history to the Un-American Activities Committee is the "high commission" established under Queen Elizabeth to look into "all errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offenses, contempts, and enormities whatsoever." The difference is that the purpose of the high commission was to coerce conformity in theological doctrine with the established church of England; the Un-American Activities Committee can coerce conformity with anything a few untutored bigots may consider "Americanism."

Poland Today

BY ALEXANDER WERTH

III. Foreign and Domestic Politics

Warsaw, August

IF CZECH opinion, with its essentially "Western" slant, was upset by the government's refusal to go to the Paris conference on the Marshall plan, Poles received the news that Poland would not go with resignation or cynical amusement. A Warsaw taxi driver remarked to me: "When Daddy doesn't want to go, his son can't go either." Since then the government press has constantly stressed a single aspect of "Paris"—the top priority which the Americans, it alleges, wish to give to Germany. This has not been without effect on Polish opinion. There was also some malicious gratification among government supporters when they learned that the American Congress would not consider the Marshall plan for another six months. That Poland would welcome dollar credits nobody denies, and one of the points made by Mr. Modzelewski, the Foreign Minister,

when I saw him, was that if the Americans had not for political reasons held up their \$90,000,000 credit to Poland, Polish coal production would now be much higher.

Many of the principal members of the Polish government, including the Communists, were in fact anxious to go to Paris. But it is significant that both Foreign Minister Modzelewski and Prime Minister Cirankiewicz, when I saw them, expressed the hope that some new, more acceptable offer would yet be made. Both also were emphatic in declaring that they did not wish to see Europe split into two blocs. But at the same time Mr. Cirankiewicz insisted that it was vitally important for Poland to "keep in" with Russia—because of the danger of a German military revival—and that Western Europe must recognize this necessity. Indicating that the Slav bloc did not now exist except as a safeguard against German aggression, Mr. Cirankiewicz said: "We need the alliance with Russia not for today but for the time when Germany may become a danger to Poland again."

Germany may not be dangerous while the occupation lasts, but what will happen afterward? Our first consideration must be our alliance with our neighbors and," he added significantly, "also with France. We want the alliance with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union to become a Polish political tradition. In America there is too much talk of a "preventive war"; we know that war is neither in Poland's nor in America's interest. . . . American politicians can afford to have a day-to-day foreign policy, but we are bound by geopolitical and historical factors to find a long-term policy which will safeguard Poland's will to live." In reply to my question the Prime Minister said that he did not believe Poland's independence was threatened by the Soviet Union. "There is no 'Russian penetration,'" he declared. "What is penetrating Poland is socialism—socialism of our making."

I asked the Prime Minister whether the Polish government had any ideas on what to do with the sixty or seventy million Germans living next door on a territory little larger than Poland. To this he replied that he hoped something concrete would at last emerge during the November meeting of the Foreign Ministers. From talks with other Polish leaders I gathered that one of the current ideas on the subject is that Germany should become essentially a manufacturing country, chiefly of consumer goods, and depend on imports for raw materials and cheap food; Poland would willingly exchange its agricultural produce for German manufactured goods. The fact that Germany would have to import most of its food would be a safeguard of security. Mr. Modzelewski said that Poland, which wished Europe as a whole to be restored, might produce a general plan.

Naturally the German menace, to which every Pole is highly responsive, is an ever-recurring theme in the press. At an open-air meeting at Olsztyn (Allenstein) in East Prussia I heard a Polish officer declare, amid applause, that Poland "would fight any country that employed German troops as its mercenaries."

IT IS interesting that the policy of the present government is to "bring all the Poles back," thus reversing the emigration policy of 1919-39. Mr. Modzelewski told me that 80,000 Poles had come back from Britain and the British zone of Germany, 15,000 from each area in May and June, and that inducements were being offered to Polish emigrants of long standing in Yugoslavia and Rumania and also to Polish miners in France and western Germany to come back. "The political conception of an émigré Poland has fallen through," Mr. Modzelewski said. The Poles from Britain, I was told, have become absorbed in the general population, and I might add from personal observation that although many, in principle, are still hostile to the government, they are impressed by the improved conditions in Poland—several recalled to me with a touch of anger the horror stories

about Poland they had read in the émigré press in Britain.

While there have been some arrests lately, though not among the repatriates, not even diplomats highly critical of the Polish government claim that they have been numerous. In principle a charge must be preferred within three months of a person's arrest, and there must be a trial. There is no evidence of anyone having "disappeared." Many here argue that in the course of a revolution like Poland's some repression is inevitable, but that it is held to an "absolute minimum" and that there is "very much less of it than in the Pilsudski days."

Lately a number of priests have been arrested for "subversive activity," but though the government is in no doubt about the hostility of the church hierarchy, these arrests may be said to be the first of their kind. Despite an outward semblance of unanimity, the lower ranks of the clergy are in fact divided in their attitude to the government; many are genuinely impressed by Poland's progress in the last two years. The church also considers it to its material interest not to antagonize the government unduly, for its important estates of some 300,000 hectares have not been affected by the land reform. But generally the church is thought to be the government's most dangerous opponent, with a large influence among the peasantry. Last January the government proposed to the Vatican the resumption of diplomatic relations but has received no reply. Some satisfaction has been derived from the comments on the freedom of the Catholic church in Poland recently made by Cardinal Griffin on his return to England.

MANY of the Poles who have returned from England have been greatly reassured by the fact that the Russians are not in evidence at all. I have traveled all over Poland and have seen extremely few Russians except on their own communication lines to Germany. It is true that there are still many Russian officers in the Polish army, but this is largely due to the shortage of trained Polish personnel; after the First World War, one is reminded, French officers remained in the Polish army till 1928. The Russians in general are not liked, and the "Russian occupation" of 1944-45 has left some bad memories; discipline among some of the Russian troops, especially after victory, went to pieces completely. A growing number of Poles, however, are beginning to realize that it was the Russians, after all, who drove the Germans out of Poland, and the fact that "they did not stay on" is also put to their credit.

It would take too long to discuss the complex relationship existing between the four government parties, and especially between the Socialists and Communists. The Communists as the tougher and more coherent party tend to capture many of the key positions such as the governorships of the provinces, but without the support of the Socialists and trade unions they could not do much.

I shall confine myself for the present to quoting the statement Mr. Cierankiewicz, the Socialist Premier, made to me on the subject:

We are two parties, each with its own particular "dynamics," and there are therefore inevitable difficulties; but the Communists cannot rule without the Socialists, and since there is no other practicable government formula, we are going to stick together, and relations are bound to improve. This collaboration is important not only for Poland; it is important as an example for the whole of Europe.

Mr. Cierankiewicz made it plain that while he was all in favor of the united front he was opposed to the formation of a Unity Party. The Communist leader, Mr.

Gomulka, has been advocating such a party, though not as an immediate goal.

The Communists, despite a fairly large "bread-and-butter" membership, feel that they are "all bone and no flesh" and that a Unity Party would give them greater physical substance. But the majority of the Socialists will not hear of it for the present. In compensation they tend to condone the repression of the old-line Social Democrats who refuse to cooperate with the Communists at any price, and who frequently display a dangerous sympathy with the right. The coming trial of twenty-three such Socialists should be revealing.

[The fourth article of Mr. Werth's series will discuss the new lands Poland has acquired from Germany.]

The Death of Lyuh Woon-Hyung

BY HUGH DEANE

Seoul, Korea, August

IN A dispatch from Seoul reporting the assassination on July 19 of Lyuh Woon-Hyung, the outstanding liberal leader in South Korea, the *New York Times* hinted that perhaps the crime was committed by the Communists, from whose clutches Lyuh was trying to escape. On July 23 the police arrested a nineteen-year-old youth—captured in three different places according to three different police announcements—and a high police official declared that the alleged assassin "had been sent from North Korea." But almost nobody here, except of course the extreme rightists led by Rhee Syngman and Kim Koo, professes to believe that Lyuh was killed by Communists, northern or southern.

Not even the Americans, whose misinformation about South Korea is a main prop of the right, really believe it. A fair indication was General John R. Hodge's statement—read by a lieutenant—at Lyuh's funeral on August 3 that the "implications and motivations . . . are still unsolved." The Americans are rarely clear about the actions and intentions of the right; they are usually coldly certain about the malevolence of the left.

To most of the thousands of people standing in the hot sun in Seoul Stadium on August 3 the implications of Lyuh's assassination were much clearer than they were to General Hodge. Lyuh had been struck down while trying to build a broad political front to oppose the extreme right, which was using every method, including terror, to disrupt the Soviet-American negotia-

tions and to establish a separate government in South Korea. Lyuh's discussions with Kim Kiu-sic and other leaders of the moderate right were watched with some misgivings by the left, which feared that the price of an agreement might be its isolation; they were watched with dismay and violent hatred by the anti-trusteeship right, which regarded centrists, moderate rightists, and even the Americans as tools of the reds. Kim Kiu-sic, like Lyuh, was called a national traitor and threatened with the "hammer of justice."

To believe that Lyuh was killed by the left was like believing that the German Communists had set fire to the Reichstag. Lyuh's younger brother, Lyuh Woon-hong, who heads the small, middle-of-the-road Social Democratic Party, was asked bluntly by this writer whether he thought the leftists or the rightists were guilty. Lyuh Woon-hong broke with his more illustrious brother last fall, charging that the latter was being led by the nose by the Communists, and presumably has no love for the left. He replied: "Absolutely, without hesitation, I say the rightists."

A few days after Lyuh was killed it seemed for a moment that he might achieve in death what he had sought while alive. A National Salvation Committee, embracing the left, the center, and part of the moderate right, was born in the first hot abhorrence of the act of terrorism. The police, acting with alacrity, outlawed it on the grounds that it had not registered and that it would "agitate the people" and provoke terrorism. (A left-wing intellectual commented bitterly, "Are people who carry watches to blame for pickpocketing?")

If Lyuh was killed by the right, he was buried by the left. For a fortnight his body lay in state in the head-

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quarters of the Laboring People's Party, which Lyuh established last May. Tens of thousands of people came to stand before the casket, paying their last respects: white-clad women chanting and wailing, intellectuals, students, workers, and farmers. Democratic organizations from all over South Korea wrote messages on the walls in blood, pledging to continue the struggle for the people's republic, condemning the terror, echoing the fervent hope expressed by Lyuh in his last radio address that the Joint Commission would reach an agreement.

August 3, the day of the funeral, was one of the most peaceful days of the summer. Police, on foot, mounted, and in jeeps, were stationed every fifty feet along the two-mile route to Seoul Stadium, but they had little to do. Except for a few young men caught singing leftist songs, which were prohibited for the day, no one was arrested; the terrorists in Seoul took a holiday. The long procession moved gravely between the lines of white-clad, silently watching people.

The police sought to minimize the significance of the funeral. They prohibited the closing of stores, the suspension of music and dancing, and the hoisting of mourning flags "as would besit the death of the highest administrator." They banned the display of political slogans and party flags, save the flags of Lyuh's own party. But they could not ban politics. The solid ranks of the People's Democratic Front were a plain political statement. For the few hours of the service the left, the small center, and the moderate right stood united, as Lyuh would have wished. The extreme right did not participate. The Independence Party, headed by Kim Koo, who is popularly regarded as the chief of the hatchet men, disdained to offer even perfunctory regrets. A number of leaders of Rhee's Democratic Party, political ally of Kim Koo's group, sent a thousand yen each to the funeral committee—which the committee refused to accept.

LYUH has a secure place in the history of Korea's struggle for independence. In 1919 he joined the provisional government-in-exile in Shanghai. In the early twenties he went twice to Moscow and talked with Lenin; he is said to have played a part in bringing about the entente between Sun Yat-sen and the Soviets. He later broke with the conservative provisional government and worked with the leftists. In 1929 he was seized by the Japanese consular police in Shanghai and taken back to Korea; he never again left Korea. After getting out of prison in 1933 he became president of the Korean-language *Central Daily News* and an active sponsor of Korean athletics, which he regarded as indirect resistance to Japanization.

In 1943 Lyuh saw what was happening and plunged into illegal politics. In August, 1944, he organized the underground Emancipation League, with branches in

Manchuria and China and contact with Koreans in Yen-an. After the liberation this group, with the released political prisoners, led the almost magical upsurge of the People's Republic movement.

For the first month or so after the liberation Lyuh was the unchallenged leader in South Korea. He was the de facto head of the People's Republic; even part of the right, momentarily frightened, yielded to him, and for a time it seemed that he would establish himself as the Korean Sun Yat-sen. When the Americans came in, they broke him, insultingly, clumsily, but effectively. Few Koreans have forgotten a fatuous statement by General A. V. Arnold, military governor, on October 10, 1945, in which he implied that Lyuh and other leaders of the People's Republic were "foolish or venal men."

Thereafter Lyuh was never quite sure of himself. He kept thinking that perhaps the errors of the Americans were due to misinformation, that perhaps the United States was really interested in democratizing South Korea, that perhaps with patience he could influence American policy. He veered away from the left. When last December the majority of his People's Party, together with the Communist Party and the New People's Party, formed the Labor Party, Lyuh refused to go along, charging Communist domination. In May he joined a number of ex-Communists and others in forming the Laboring People's Party.

Yet at every crisis Lyuh stood with the left against the extreme right. He refused General Hodge's appointment to the Democratic Council, which was packed with rightists; he refused to be a minority figurehead in an abortive "political unification" committee selected by Rhee Syngman. He abstained from the phony elections of last November; he never had any dealings with the anti-trusteeship crowd. To his death he remained on the praesidium of the People's Democratic Front, though it was dominated by the Labor Party. So weak was the center, so compelling was the pull to the left, that even his Laboring People's Party, designed as a non-Communist organ, began negotiations to enter the People's Front shortly after it was formed.

Already some people are saying that Lyuh, like Sun Yat-sen, died at the right time. Lyuh was a man of the middle class, temperamentally a moderate, and it was hard for him to see his friends going to the right or left. Faced with the same choice himself, Lyuh sometimes leaned one way, sometimes the other, not because he was an opportunist but because his only principles were broad ones and because he was a peace-loving man with a catholic capacity for friendship. *Norjuk Ilmin* (*Toiling People*), organ of the Labor Party, wrote of Lyuh's death, "The tragedy of Lyuh is the tragedy of the people." Much can be read into this. Lyuh's personal tragedy was that he was a moderate in a society in which what little center existed is melting away.

Del Vayo—Europe Is Skeptical

Paris, August 27

THE United States is already more or less aware of Europe's growing skepticism about the Marshall plan. But it is here in Paris that one realizes how grave are the doubts of its success. "That Marshall plan is a good idea," most people say. And they say it in the same melancholy tone they use to discuss the plan for world government now under consideration "somewhere in Europe" at a congress that has aroused the interest of no one except the delegates themselves. The immediate reason for this skepticism is the contradiction between the urgency of preparing for a winter so critical that people dare not even think about it and the slowness with which the idea behind the Harvard speech is being translated into action.

For Europeans, American aid held the attraction of speed; they had a deep faith in the dynamism and aggressiveness of the United States, in its ability to accomplish quickly anything it set out to do. Now comes the news that Congressional approval is not expected before next February—which means that at best the Marshall plan will not begin to show results until several months after that date. Unfamiliar with American politics and the peculiar relations between the White House and Congress, the people of Europe are shocked by what to them is an inexplicable delay and are beginning to say, "By then we shall either have starved to death or found a solution among ourselves."

And with that disillusionment has come the growing suspicion that American credits will prove no universal panacea. Last week's agreement ending the conversion of British sterling into dollars had an electrifying effect on French opinion, which is quick to grasp the significance of international events, and it will also have repercussions in the other countries of Europe. The inability of American capitalism to establish a healthy, stable equilibrium of world exchange and commerce, together with the slowness of American aid, has shattered European confidence in the magical restorative powers of the dollar.

There are other reasons for skepticism which have existed since the Marshall plan was first formulated and which I discussed on this page some weeks ago. Perhaps the decisive one is that a Europe split into blocs cannot be reconstructed. The division conceived by partisans of a new *cordon sanitaire* against Russia can serve the politics of war, not those of peace.

East and West complement each other, and need each other. This was true before World War II; it is even more true today when European industry has in large part been destroyed, when England and France have lost most of their foreign markets, when France has reduced its daily bread ration to 200 grams per person, and when lack of coal is the great obstacle to the rebuilding of Western Europe.

France, for example, is more interested in obtaining coal from Poland now than in all the long-term-credit aid it may receive when the Marshall plan eventually goes into effect. The reception accorded Hilary Minc, Polish Minister

of Industry and Commerce, who arrived in Paris a few weeks ago to negotiate a new Franco-Polish commercial agreement, shows that France is far from considering itself part of an exclusive Western bloc. Polish coal output in 1938 was only 30,000,000 tons; by 1949 it will have reached the impressive figure of 80,000,000 tons a year. In increased trade with Poland, France sees a partial solution for the coal-hunger of its industry, one that may release M. Bidault from the necessity of accepting a decision on the Ruhr that goes contrary to the French conception of national security. Anxiety about future security has cropped up time and again in the discussions of the past month; Hervé Alphand, French delegate to the three-power conference which opened in London on August 22, is reported to have said to a closed session: "Never again do we want our mineral shipments to Germany to come back to us in the form of shells and rocket planes." This anxiety is aggravated by the fear that all the fascist forces possible of regeneration will be used to implement an anti-Russian policy based on Germany; Albert Bayet, president of the French Press Association, recently observed, "Between fascism maintained in Spain and magnates reinstalled in the Ruhr, France will not be able to breathe in peace."

But it is not France alone, with its problem—or what some call its obsession—of security, that is involved. One after another the countries of Europe, realizing that their national interests are incompatible with the policy of blocs, are directly negotiating bilateral accords between East and West. Today reliable London sources report that new feelers may soon go out to Moscow in the hope that Britain may receive 500,000 tons of badly needed grain this year; Russia would be glad to have British machinery and seems ready to promise early grain deliveries. All the Western countries are seeking to conclude trade agreements with Czechoslovakia, whose economic recovery continues to amaze those who have visited it. In short, the European nations are convinced that they must hang together or assuredly they will hang separately. That is why, despite the strong current of opinion which favors risking everything in a test of strength against Russia, the immense majority still hope that the principle of peaceful collaboration will be reestablished.

No one here is foolish enough to believe in the possibility of a return to the entente that existed before San Francisco; on the other hand, no responsible person with whom I have talked is ready to concede the absolute impossibility of reaching an agreement that will end the present tensions.

In general it is thought that at some moment or other relations between the United States and Russia—for this is the key—will reach the point where the only alternative is war or negotiation. And because most people simply cannot conceive of another war, they feel that the two countries will begin to negotiate. That will be the moment to utilize the constructive aspects of the Marshall plan and to integrate them into a serious effort for the reconstruction of a united Europe.

BOOKS and the ARTS

Shabby Goetterdaemmerung
NUREMBERG DIARY. By G. M. Gilbert. Farrar, Straus and Company. \$5.

AS "PRISON psychologist" Dr. G. M. Gilbert was given free access to the prisoners on trial at Nürnberg, and this book is the informal record of his observations. The accused were evidently glad to chat with a man who was neither a lawyer, a jailer, nor a journalist. They were delighted to find at last an American who could understand their language: the scarcity of German-speaking officers in the American army is one of the minor mysteries of the war. Dr. Gilbert seems to have struck the right attitude—human, but not effusively friendly. Although he was a mere captain, the prisoners respected him as a *Fachmann*; they even played with alacrity his little game of psychological tests. The report, although edited, does not seem to have been doctored. Untechnical, unofficial, vivid but not lurid, it inspires confidence.

The strongest impression we receive from these pages is that the Nazi gang was not homogeneous. Göring tried to impose upon his associates a single line of defense—a defiant blustering attitude which might, in a surprisingly short time, have revived the Nazi legend. But they all hated and despised "the Fat One," and went their own way. The military glared scorn at the politicians, who glared more fiercely still in return. The opportunists of the old school, Schacht and von Papen, poured contempt on the upstart and crude Nazis—whom they once had praised and served. Everybody shunned Streicher as a skunk. Hess was a grotesque and tragic figure, never able to remember for long whether his amnesia was faked or genuine. They had lived through glorious and dramatic hours; they had wielded unlimited power; yet all of them were average clever men who in normal days would have been decently successful in humdrum occupations. The Nürnberg trial was a Hamlet drama played without the prince. But the composite picture of Hitler we get from his henchmen is not that of a

genius or hero. There was a legend of the Last Girondists, fostered by Larmartine; no legend of the Last Nazis would survive the Nürnberg report. Their *Goetterdaemmerung* was shabby.

Göring, at any rate, had substance and color. But cross-examination, and the concurrent opinion of his fellow party members, made it plain that the Fat Knight was a phony. He had two lines of reasoning which were incompatible. One was the highest idealism, *deutsche Treue*, personal loyalty to a liege, right or wrong, through good fortune or bad. From these Wagnerian heights Göring tumbled down to the most cynical realism. He spoke at times with almost as harsh a voice as Professor William L. Langer. Democracy, justice, humanity? All hypocritical nonsense. There is nothing solid in this world but the coarsest immediate interests; and for these, in spite of all dogooders, men will keep fighting world without end. "Of course," Göring adds wisely, "not the common people: there is nothing in it for them. But under whatever regime it is the *leaders* of a country who determine the policy."

Göring thus tried to shape his own figure in history: a bluff professional soldier, of a good family, with the strictest code of his caste; a German patriot to the end; above all, a pattern of old Germanic loyalty. His companions shrugged at his heroic pose. They knew that the Odinic fighter was a profiteer on the grandest scale, fond of a soft life and of vulgar luxuries, a dope addict and a moral coward. The Wagnerian trappings would not fit. In private conversation Göring assumed the tone of a Kiplingesque sergeant. His thoughts, in the various lines he chose, were rudimentary. Yet he had some skills. Next to Schacht and Seyss-Inquart, he had the highest I. Q. of the band—138—a superior man, a near-genius. But Gilbert is sensible enough to have little faith in I. Q.'s. "The day-to-day record of the conversations and reactions of the Nazi leaders proved to be more revealing than the sum of all the tests could be." Are psychologists learning wisdom at last?

The high point in the report is the testimony of Colonel Rudolf Hoess, commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, who calmly explained how he had performed the incredible feat of exterminating two and a half million people in three years. Hoess's defense was perfectly simple: Orders are orders; his not to reason why. "From our entire training the thought of refusing an order just didn't enter our heads. . . . Guess you cannot understand our world." Brought up strictly, in an austere Catholic family, he had transferred from the church to the Nazi hierarchy the principle of passive obedience, *perinde ac cadaver*.

Hoess's factual report and a film of atrocities seem to have struck the Nazi leaders with genuine bewilderment. They swore *they did not know*. This strains credibility: yet how few people, even in high stations, knew of our atomic secret? The underlings, like Hoess himself, obeyed without question; those who had ordered, Hitler and Himmler, were dead. On an enormously larger scale it is the same story as in the First World War. The leaders sternly preach *Schrecklichkeit*: no humanitarian nonsense about them. But when terroristic methods are actually applied, the tough supermen turn soft and swear they meant nothing of the kind: "You know us! We Germans are cultured and Christian gentlemen!"

Only Hans Frank, Governor General of Poland, drew the full consequence from these revelations. He had experienced a religious conversion; he had abjured his criminal errors; now he accepted, and almost welcomed, full responsibility for them. But his Dostoevski attitude, self-abjection, abysmal repentance, flights into mysticism, struck Dr. Gilbert as somewhat hysterical.

All the Nazi leaders, except perhaps Streicher, confessed that before the end they had realized the monstrous imbecility of the whole scheme. Yet they kept serving what they knew to be moronic fanaticism. Blame them we can, and must: not, however, without a homeward look. When war is declared, patriotism commands passive

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obedience: even Niemöller offered to kill for the greater glory of Hitler. There was no lawful way of removing Hitler, any more than Darlan—or today Franco. But it is not easy for a man, especially for an officer, to decide that he should murder his commander-in-chief. The Jews were in Germany what the Communists are with us today: the enemies of mankind. "Here, but for the grace of God, goes John Doe." Hans did not want to be "purged" as disloyal; neither does John. John too has a career to make, a family to support; martyrdom is a sorry trade, especially if you have to suffer for the sake of people you don't like. I have faith in the common sense of the Common Man; I never believed in his mental courage.

ALBERT GUÉRARD

Baudelaire and Others

ONE HUNDRED POEMS FROM LES FLEURS DU MAL. By Charles Baudelaire. Translated by C. F. MacIntyre. University of California Press. \$5.

BAUDELAIRE, RIMBAUD, VERLAINE (Selected Verse and Prose Poems). Edited, with an Introduction, by Joseph M. Bernstein. The Citadel Press. \$3.

MR. MACINTYRE worked very hard at his volume of translations, and Mr. Bernstein did hardly any work at all, merely reprinting by permission of different copyright holders; yet Mr. Bernstein's is the better book.

In order to justify the task he set himself—an almost complete translation of Baudelaire—Mr. MacIntyre is forced to insist on something which no one has yet been able to prove: the architectural structure of "Les Fleurs du Mal"; incapable of making a perfect translation of a single poem, he strategically spreads out his mediocrity over the whole. It may be valuable, for the sake of completeness, to include piece after piece like "Le Soleil"; Baudelaire often made the mistake of writing verse about poetry.

He was terribly frightened, filled with panic, knowing himself the only one of his time with the terrible gift of seeing reality after the fashion of primitive man—he called it the "sense of correspondences"—and the

only one capable of using language as it had been used thousands of years ago by the early priest-poets who controlled the god through incantation, through sounds produced by the things deeply hidden in man's mind, having nothing to do with the harmony of the syllogism and giving to words their own reality, only scarcely connected with the objects they represent. It is Rimbaud who gave us the exact truth about Baudelaire: "But since to inspect the Invisible and to hear the Unheard is something else than recapturing the spirit of dead things, Baudelaire is the first seer, king of poets, a real god. Nevertheless, he lived in too artistic surroundings, and the form for which he is so praised is paltry. Inventions of the Unknown require new forms." However, in the great poems like "Un Voyage à Cythère" some amazing explosions occur precisely because new wine is poured into old bottles. Not that the reader would ever gather this from reading Mr. MacIntyre's translations, which are flat and pompous, and cheat all over the place.

To prove this I have a flock of notes which I am herding into the wastebasket; a few examples should be enough. "J'aime le souvenir de ces époques nues, Dont Phoebus se plaisait à dorer les statues" means, simply enough: "I like remembering that naked time whose statues Phoebus delighted in gilding," and not, because Mr. MacIntyre wants to rime with gold: "I love to think of epochs naked and old, Statues smiling Phoebus touched with gold," where the word *old* is the very contrary of the intent of the whole poem, which has to do with the youth of the race in contrast with what Baudelaire considers the effeteness and decadence of our time. In "Recueillement," one of the perfect sonnets, whose setting is Paris and the river Seine, "smiling Regret arises from the deep," because the next line ends in *sleets*, but *deep* can only refer to the sea and fails to make sense or even a decent prose gloss to the original. As he tells us in his preface, "This effect cannot be rendered by the clever alternating of pat feminine with masculine rhymes. Nor can its disturbing, haunting quality be imitated by coyly seductive strip-tease effects, Victorian half-evasions, or explanatory padding—

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often in search of rhymes." Nor by Mr. MacIntyre, who here conveniently has classified his own deficiencies. "Played without falsehood, without anxiety," if it doesn't strip-tease, more than half-evades meaning when it tries to translate "Jouissaient sans mensonge et sans anxiété," where *jouissaient* in this context means coitus and has nothing to do with Friedrich Froebel. I have read MacIntyre carefully, and in the last two months have gone back to his book in different moods to be sure I was being fair to him. He has worked so hard that it is sad to find his labor of no value. He is oddly inept. How can one write—as he does in his preface, seeming to think it necessary to praise one great poet by damning another: "Rimbaud, by his sensationalism, sold damaged goods to the Dadaists, the Gagaists (!), and the Surrealists"; and, "One can only regret that French literature, in this final stage of *décadence*, should have forgotten its old love for the lucid and the logical and have preferred to follow the crazed meanderings of a precocious boy rather than the serene classicism of Baudelaire's legitimate heirs"?

The most interesting part of the book consists of sixty-three pages of finely printed notes, translated and rewritten from the standard Crépét and Dantec editions, and interspersed with anecdotes and cute personal remarks ("I am not very pleased with my version of this poem") and an athletic Harris-tweed donnishness mixed with low wit: "Lot, whom wine made both careless and enterprising . . ."; "This brother-sister business, used so often in the book, fuddles up the later poets, too, notably Verlaine. . . ." Mr. MacIntyre's imposing bibliography omits René Laforgue's indispensable study of Baudelaire, and a reading of it might jolt him out of a priggishly prurient adolescence which threatens to become static.

Mr. Bernstein's "Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Verlaine" has a good many fine translations, though the worth-while editorial job would have been to gather the best individual translations of individual poems. What is the good of having the uniformity of Arthur Symons's poetic style when it is uniformly bad. On the other hand, Symons's rendering of Baudelaire's Prose Poems is excellent. Gertrude

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Hall's versions of Verlaine do not include his great poems (guess why!), and for the reader wholly devoid of French it is hard to tell whether Miss Hall or Verlaine is bad.

The really wonderful surprise in Bernstein's book is J. Norman Cameron's translations of Rimbaud's verse poems; Cameron rhymes, incredibly keeps twelve syllables to the Alexandrine line without padding, and at any rate brings Rimbaud as close to English as seems possible. The satisfaction you have in reading Cameron is that of coming across a great new poet in English.

RENE BLANC-ROOS

Hawks and Acorns

FOOTNOTES ON NATURE. By John Kieran. With Wood Engravings by Nora S. Unwin. Doubleday and Company. \$3.

DURING his heyday on the *Times* Mr. Kieran was not the only sports writer who could quote Tennyson and Shakespeare. As a matter of fact, poetry was rather a weakness of the tribe, as in the case, for instance, of the late Grantland Rice. But Mr. Kieran certainly was the only one who ever looked for an unusual sort of acorn during a Worlds Series or could tell one kind of warbler from another even without his binoculars. In a word, he not only knew a hawk from a handsaw but also one species of hawk from another. The present book, the second in his nature series, has nothing to say about batting averages but a good deal about walking in the New York region and what is to be found there in the way of plants, animals, and birds—the latter being his specialty. Mr. Kieran is evidently an amateur ornithologist of the very first rank, and he tells something of the boyhood and young manhood during which the interest developed. Most of the book, however, is given over to accounts of rambles taken in the company of various friends whose professions were as different as that of drama critic and entymologist. It is unpretentious, informal, and factual rather than philosophical, but it does manage in some way to communicate a good deal of the author's keen pleasure. Both Tennyson and Shakespeare do, besides, frequently raise their pretty heads.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

What Price Prejudice?

THE HIGH COST OF PREJUDICE.

By Bucklin Moon. Julian Messner. \$2.50.

WITH enviable courage Bucklin Moon has attempted an impossible task, namely, to estimate the high cost of prejudice in the United States. While he has outlined the areas that would have to be investigated in preparing such an estimate, he has not been able to prepare either a profit-and-loss statement or a balance sheet. So many

Which Magazine D'ya Read?

"CHARLES BAUDELAIRE: One Hundred Poems from 'Les Fleurs du Mal,' translated by C. F. MacIntyre (University of California Press). Here, at last, is a good modern version of this important book. Mr. MacIntyre, by the use of off-rhymes and a loose rhythm, does a remarkably successful job of keeping Baudelaire's form reasonably intact while retaining his force and meaning. He commendably adopts the arrangement of the second edition of 1861, the last overseen by the poet, but he has restored the six poems suppressed by a French court and dropped from that edition. The French texts, two portraits, interesting and unconventional notes, and an excellent bibliography are included."

New Yorker, July 19, 1947

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of the high costs of prejudice are hidden in statistics of crime, juvenile delinquency, and social services that they can never, perhaps, be disengaged from other factors. Moreover, how can one estimate the "cost," in social or individual terms, of a system that deprives millions of American citizens of normal incentives for self-improvement? Difficulties of this sort, of which Mr. Moon is well aware, can be traced to our system of cost accounting, which reckons "costs" and "profits" not in social but in individual terms.

Nevertheless, more intensive research might have provided a few more specific estimates of the cost of prejudice. For example, Mordecai Ezekiel once estimated that merely by giving Negroes equal wages for equal work the national income would be enlarged by \$6,000,000,000 annually, of which \$1,000,000,000 would go to the Treasury in taxes. It should have been possible, also, to analyze the costs of dual or segregated public institutions in a single Southern state. While specifications of this kind are lacking, Mr. Moon has certainly "blocked in" the major areas of cost in a most competent and intelligent manner.

Of particular value is the chapter on what Jim Crow has cost the South politically. By saddling the region with incompetent representatives and a one-party system that stifles political progress racial demagoguery has robbed the South of the means by which it might long ago have solved certain of its basic problems. In the absence of effective opposition Southern Representatives usually have a long tenure of office and through seniority consistently capture the key committee chairmanships when their party is in power. Thus the denial of democracy in one region is felt in every other. If Jim Crow is a burden to the South, the South is a burden to the nation. In dealing with the argument that we must proceed gradually in correcting this situation for fear of provoking a violent reaction in the South Mr. Moon has put his finger on one of the underlying fallacies. "True," he writes, "we can go on slowly improving the lot of the Negro at the same time we are rapidly bettering our own," but, at this rate, "the Negro problem" would be with us always.

At one point in his effort to prove

that prejudice does not pay, however, Mr. Moon unwittingly glosses over an important aspect of the problem. While prejudice does not pay, it can be highly profitable for certain groups. There is an oblique recognition of this fact in the statement that "perhaps" prejudice may be profitable to "a handful of persons"; but this is somewhat naive. It has been "demonstrated" *ad nauseam* that in the long run economic exploitation is not in the interest of the exploiting classes, but this demonstration has never worked a revolution in attitudes. For by the nature of the situation these classes are not permitted to take a long-range view of the issue. They are compelled to make immediate decisions on a day-to-day basis, often with the competitive factor uppermost in their thinking. Hence the immediate profit, the short-range advantage, necessarily governs their thinking. Unfortunately it is not "a handful of persons" who profit from the techniques of racial dominance in the South but a social class entrenched in power, with numerous satellite groups, powerful "silent" partners in the North, and a firm grasp on the institutions and economy of the region. Numerically the ultimate beneficiaries may be a fraction of the total population, but the power they represent and the influence they exert cannot be minimized.

Prejudice is the cement which holds together a structure of power. Admit-

tedly wasteful and costly, it is profitable on a short-range basis to particular groups in the sense that it insures their dominance over the great mass of poor Southerners, white and Negro. Hence it is difficult to imagine that the beneficiaries of this dispensation could ever be made to yield the reins of power by arguments that by so doing they would be acting in the long-range interest of their class. The exercise of power is habit-forming and can often blind individuals and classes to their real interests.

The publication of this volume is further proof of how an understanding of the factors involved in what we used to call "the race problem" has increased since 1940. Merely to compare Mr. Moon's clear, calm-mannered, realistic analysis with some of the frightened, myth-ridden analyses that appeared in the twenties gives proof of the progress that has been made. While we have not "solved" the race problem, we at least know that it is solvable and have a strategy for its solution. Now the question is, do we want really to solve it or merely to ease the tensions which are its outer manifestations? The issues cut very deep, for as Mr. Moon writes, "so long as our false concepts of racial superiority continue, the Negro can never be an American, but more than that, Americans can never be free men."

CAREY MC WILLIAMS

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Fiction in Review

BUDD SCHULBERG'S "The Harder They Fall" (Random House, \$3), the new novel by the author of the highly regarded "What Makes Sammy Run?" is full of so much interesting information about the prize-ring—how fighters are made and unmade, how the promotion rackets work—that one could wish it had narrative powers to match its powers of exposition. I do not mean that, technically speaking, Mr. Schulberg tells his story less well than he needs to; on the contrary, he is technically very gifted. But his novel is uncomfortably thin in the realm of the moral imagination, that sphere from which we derive the fresh and meaningful insights of fiction. In the sense of being fervently opposed to the greed and corruption that have reduced boxing to a saturnalia of brutality "The Harder They Fall" is an undeniably moral book. But like so many moral novelists of our day, especially those who concern themselves with the lower depths of our civilization, Mr. Schulberg is much more fervent than perceptive, much "wiser" to the methods of human degradation than wise about what would constitute a better way to act and be. He never even raises the question of why people choose to earn their livings by and off fighting. His imagination deals wholly in the soft, ready-to-hand oppositions—

loyalty versus treachery, innocence versus venality, pure sexuality versus lust, art versus mammon—which we recognize as the familiar moral baggage of the boys in the back-room.

The characters in "The Harder They Fall" immediately announce themselves as the established "types" of error or virtue. There is Nick, slum boy turned gangster, with the usual paraphernalia of expensive cigars, toilet waters, body-guard, and son in a good prep school. There is Nick's wife, an ex-Follies beauty, secret tippler and betrayer of a husband blind to anything but the "class" symbolized by her addiction to best-selling novels. There is Eddie, narrator of the story, one-time Princeton student and now Nick's press agent, who waters his drinks with tears for the Pulitzer prize play he will never write. There is Beth of the ladylike ardor, who is Eddie's dream of decent womanhood, and Shirley, maternal madame of a house on Eighth Avenue, Eddie's dream of womanhood without a college education. There is Danny, who anaesthetizes himself with alcohol against the spectacle of the degeneration of the manly art of self-defense. And finally there is Toro Molina, a peaceable Argentinian peasant become fall-guy for the fight racketeers.

Mr. Schulberg is telling Toro's story. Toro cannot box and doesn't want to learn, but because he is enormously tall he has been brought to America as the

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new challenger from the Andes; before the story ends, this giant version of the "little man" has made a million crooked dollars for his backers and has himself been annihilated. There is a touching dignity about this sad and unheroic hero—Mr. Schulberg's communicated feeling for Toro is, I think, the best achievement of his book—and a scarcely-to-be-questioned truth in his author's conviction that money is no respecter of such persons. On the other hand, one is disconcerted by Mr. Schulberg's large reliance upon the money motivation of his characters, which gives his novel a curiously old-fashioned flavor considerably at odds with the strictly contemporary quality of its language and pictorial detail. For if the last fifteen years have taught us nothing else, surely they have taught us the insufficiency of the idea that money is the root of all evil; we have had not only psychology and anthropology to show us the degree to which money is simply a social expression of far more primitive needs, but also the lesson of the dictator countries to prove how much more fierce than the pure money drive is the complex power drive. That we no longer believe in economic determinism as we once did seems to me to be clearly demonstrated by the change that has taken place on the Communist-liberal front, where the appeal to our sense of economic insecurity has been almost entirely displaced by an appeal to dimmer and deeper emotions of fear and anger; thus the English Labor government pursues its social program with virtually no encouragement from our left-wing journals, because here was economic revolution without the terror and bloodshed which truly excite our political emotions, while Palestine, all terror and battle, excites a fierce partisanship. Mr. Schulberg's proposition that less blood would flow were there less greed is, I am afraid, a sweet throwback to an earlier day than ours.

But if Mr. Schulberg is a bit behind the times in still subscribing to the money myth, he is, as I have said, precisely on the contemporary line in the account his language and actions take of our present-day appetite for violence. "The Harder They Fall" not only has a full complement of battered heads and smashed bodies; it is also written in the walloping, slugging, jabbing vernacular

of a society in love with its own destruction. I suppose Hemingway was the last of our novelists who, assimilating the language of bar and prize-ring to a traditional cultivated idiom, gave evidence of the hope that modern and established values could work out an existence together. His followers, all too eager to throw their heritage of language into the nearest sewer, would seem to have passed beyond any such optimism.

DIANA TRILLING

[The title of Christine Weston's book of stories, "There & Then," was incorrectly given in the issue of August 23 as "There Then."]

Music

B. H. HAGGIN

IF Koussevitzky could be pleased by publication of the sickening stuff that Dr. Leichtentritt wrote about him, he would be displeased by publication of Moses Smith's accurate history and discriminating appraisal of his career and achievements.* The Koussevitzky sycophants, presumably echoing Koussevitzky himself, accused Smith of malicious slanders. Actually there is a detail here and there in which malice can be detected; but it is the occasional slight malice of someone who is essentially friendly—the irresistible revenge

* "Koussevitzky." Allen, Towne, and Heath. \$4.

for the long-endured attitudes and behavior exemplified by Koussevitzky's court action to suppress a book that was critical as well as appreciative. Also it shows itself only in a minor detail, never in a large matter. Also it never expresses itself in falsehood—and I won't complain of ill-will that uses only truth for its purpose.

If Smith describes weaknesses in the man, limitations in the conductor, flaws in the musician, they are enormously outweighed by all that he finds to admire and praise. And if, after all that Smith says about Koussevitzky's service to composers of his and our own time, both in Europe and here, he adds that the record is not perfect—that the choices of new music to play have often been arbitrary and impulsive, with many instances of undeserved neglect, and that in the case of Americans it gradually became clear that "his principal interest was in youth, on whose behalf he tended to neglect youth's elders," that "he was interested also in newness for its own sake and for the attention novelty would attract to him," so that "a second performance of the . . . work might never materialize, unless it was by one of his favorite coterie"—Smith is not being malicious, for he points out that in all this "Koussevitzky was hardly exceptional among conductors in America"; he is merely stating what must be stated to complete the factual record.

But in the words of Virgil Thomson, whose article on the subject was one of his most brilliant performances, "all

Useful Information

For us the living it is important to remember how five million died at Auschwitz and Birkenau. It may be of even more practical importance to learn and remember how a few thousand survived. Both kinds of information are available in *Smoke Over Birkenau*. It is the explicit story of death in various forms: the gas chamber, typhus, starvation. It is also the story of life: of those who, "the body naked, the hands empty, kept locked within them some inner substance, a strength increasing as the need for it increased, a freedom created through the effort of their imagination, the strain of their will, and the work of their intellect."

The author was a prisoner in Birkenau from 1942 until 1945.

SMOKE OVER BIRKENAU
by Seweryna Szmaglewska

Translated by Jadwiga Rynas
\$3.50



great artists loathe criticism. They do; they really do. What they want, what they need, what they live on, as Gertrude Stein so rightly said, is praise. They can never get enough of it. And sometimes, when they have come to be really powerful in the world, they take the attitude that anything else is libel and should be suppressed." Koussevitzky had complained of possible "irreparable injury"—which led Thomson to comment that "it is the big boys, the great big boys whom nothing could harm, that squawk the loudest." Actually, "his unique position in a world full of excellent conductors, many of them devoted to contemporary music, is that he has played more of it, launched more of it, published more of it, and paid for more of it than anybody else living. That is the clear message of Mr. Smith's biography. Everything else, a petulant gesture here and there, a musical or family quarrel, a pretentious remark, a vainglorious interview, the present court action, all these things serve the picture; they bring him more vividly to life. How can anyone mind knowing them? Only he himself, apparently, hasting fearfully toward Parnassus, though his throne there has long been reserved, and involved, no doubt, in a publicity apotheosis that has already begun, would see any value in posing before an already worshipping universe without the customary habilitation of one human weakness. His lawsuit, of course, adds to the tableau that he has essayed to compose so carefully just that."

One final point: From Smith's book one learns how the fortune of Koussevitzky's second wife made possible for him not only the career of conductor but the life of a *grand seigneur*. Those are the facts; what follows is possible interpretation of those facts. That is, I am led to wonder whether one could say that his wife's fortune made it possible for a man who had suffered poverty, rebuffs, humiliations to compensate himself emotionally for those experiences by bestowing largesse on composers, conductors, instrumentalists, singers, critics, and all the rest. And whether one could say that his theory of the conductor's function, which makes it his right and duty to alter the scores of dead composers and to do the same even with those of living composers, is an extension of that pretentious behavior for emotional compensation. And that the spouting of portentous balderdash at Tanglewood is another such extension.

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

No Contradiction

Dear Sirs: I want to congratulate you for the excellent articles by Daniel James on the A. V. C., and his account of the Communist intrigue by which our Russia Firsters try to infiltrate and control progressive organizations. But I would like to ask how you square this policy of opposition to Communist penetration and domination of progressive organizations with the attitude of Mr. del Vayo in his articles on the political situation in European countries. Mr. del Vayo, it seems to me, has excused every attempt made by the Communists to "coordinate" the Socialist parties in Europe with their own made-in-Moscow policies, and has criticized those Socialists who wished to maintain an independent and critical attitude toward the Communists because they believe that the welfare of the European workers does not coincide with the demands of Moscow's foreign policy. This might well be so, for example, because Russia's foreign policy might at times call for weakening a nation which was opposed to Russian aggression by creating economic chaos in that nation through strikes which were not justified by the true interests of the workers.

It seems to me that the same principle of preventing domination of labor or progressive organizations by those who always put the interests of Russia first applies in the case of the European Social Democrats as it does in the case of the A. V. C. Yet your articles support the Communist position in one case and oppose it in the other.

ALFRED BAKER LEWIS

New York, August 15

[It is true, as Mr. Lewis says, that Mr. del Vayo believes European Socialists and leftists generally should cooperate with Communists. He sees in the divisions of Europe's left a wide-open opportunity for reactionary and fascist revival, particularly in the present period of political instability. On the other hand, he has never excused the attempts of Communists to "coordinate" or control the Socialist parties in Europe. On the contrary, he has criticized such attempts as destructive of the strategy of working-class unity the Communists so insistently advocate. A few quotations from recent articles by Mr. del Vayo will perhaps disabuse Mr.

Lewis of the ideas expressed in his letter.

Discussing the decisions of the Montreux congress of the French Socialist Party in March, 1946, Mr. del Vayo wrote in *The Nation*:

The Communists must make the main effort to dispel the suspicion shared by many Socialists . . . that when a Communist talks unity, he means unity on his terms, with the Communist Party running the whole show for its exclusive benefit. It is too much to expect that any Socialist, however convinced of the need of working with the Communists, will let himself and his party be treated almost as intruders in the labor movement. It makes no sense to talk unity and then denounce a Socialist as a reactionary or a semi-fascist the moment he disagrees with the Communist line.

. . . Either the Communists feel strong enough to rule alone, or they need the collaboration of other progressive forces and especially of the Socialists. In the latter case, they must change their methods.

More recently, on June 28, 1947, Mr. del Vayo devoted his regular page to the problem of Socialist-Communist relations as it emerged at the recent Zürich conference of the Socialist parties of Europe. He ended his analysis with these words:

It is hoped that somehow the Socialist parties will succeed in overcoming their present difficulties. Europe needs them. There is a great mass of Socialist opinion, traditionally educated in freedom and radicalism, which does not fit in any other party. Its loss as an effective political force would be a great one, even for the Communists, although they often prefer to ignore this and do everything in their power to weaken the Socialist position. Only the reaction would benefit by their success.

—EDITORS THE NATION.]

A Future, if Permitted

Dear Sirs: Roger Baldwin's article on Korea, in your issue of August 2, commands my greatest respect. His knowledge of the country, gained in a fortnight, is deeper and clearer than that of many army officials who have been there nearly two years.

Mr. Baldwin's description of the Korean police state, supported by the Mil-

itary Government, is true. The police use tactics familiar to survivors of war-time Japanese prison camps. Beatings are routine. Our responsibility for the dangerous position of liberal and honest Koreans cannot be denied either. An example: last March students of Korean universities walked out in protest when the Military Government seized control of their studies and classes. Many were imprisoned. They were released four months later.

One point Mr. Baldwin does not make clear: in Korea leftist and Communist are not synonyms for Soviet-supporter and Stalinist. Many Koreans believe in political and cultural democracy with economic leftism, although their position is increasingly difficult, pressed, as they are, between Russian influence and the Military Government. At least 60 per cent of all Koreans support some branch of the left, Stalinist, anti-Stalinist, or other. This at first shocked, then deeply impressed me. I grew increasingly aware, toward the end of my sixteen months in Korea, of the great political awareness of the people; of their strong and deep desire for freedom and its responsibilities; and of their honest faith in their country's future—if we and Russia permit it a future.

DELL HYMES

Portland, Oregon, August 24

For Action on Spain


Dear Sir: The September session of the General Assembly of the U. N. will certainly be confronted with the necessity to decide on further action on the Spanish question.

In its Resolution on Spain of December 12, 1946, the General Assembly not only condemned the Franco regime and recommended the recall of envoys from Madrid, but declared that "if within a reasonable time" a government meeting democratic standards was not established in Spain, "the Security Council [should] consider the adequate measures to be taken in order to remedy the situation."

It is evident that a "reasonable time" has elapsed since December, 1946, and that no change has occurred in Spain. Political repression continues; men and women continue to be jailed for "crimes" which in other countries are considered the simple exercise of the rights of free speech and assembly.

The Assembly resolution recalled also that "incontrovertible documentary evidence establishes that Franco was a guilty party with Hitler and Mussolini in the conspiracy to wage

CROSSWORD PUZZLE No. 227 By MR. X.



[SPECIAL NOTICE! This is the fifth of six puzzles constructed by Mr. X in competition with Mr. Y. At the end of the competition, *The Nation's* regular crossword puzzle man will be selected on the basis of letters sent in by puzzle-solving readers.]

ACROSS

- 1 Pons makes French gold for the angel
- 5 Arles? No, Joan came from elsewhere
- 9 In my role as a French Jeeves, I am befuddled with porter
- 10 Is it profane or is it a love match?
- 11 One raid covers the ranges
- 12 Compact to ease garment workers
- 14 Queen Bee
- 15 You can incur real ire if you provoke a Sooner
- 18 Small edition
- 20 This island is part of the Dodecanese
- 21 Thought can never be compared with action, but when it ----- in us the image of truth — Madame de Staël
- 23 Ethics of a coed
- 26 Tea vitiates when it gets too fancy
- 28 Mom has always been a matchmaker
- 29 Grow to be a general
- 30 Overlooks the seignor in the confusion
- 31 Damsels in distress
- 32 Leavens the lot of those put in bondage

DOWN

- 1 The Repubs have grown rich
- 2 Five in the wild rodeo show signs of strain
- 3 Sortie on one leg is sheer sorcery

- 4 The religious ceremonies ended with spirituals
- 5 Observe the back of the head
- 6 Fast company
- 7 Ida made a theoretical pilgrimage to Mecca
- 8 Voices that thunder in the index
- 13 Violinist's last stand
- 16 The little ones receive a dime when they make their first steps
- 17 Made one for eternity
- 18 It's rude to tease about the scales
- 19 Salt came to taunt the classic thirster
- 22 Dogs roam the streets
- 23 I live in a castle in Spain
- 24 Breastbones—easy, isn't it?
- 25 Sitter finds it rather dull
- 27 Grieve when I go out over the border

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 226

ACROSS:—1 CONSOLES; 3 STREAM; 10 MODESTY; 11 ADDICTS; 12 ARENA; 13 INSOLENCE; 14 GRILL; 16 NORTHERN; 19 EPISODES; 22 ROCKY; 24 VAID; MECUM; 26 OVERT; 28 CONTROL; 29 TRIGGER; 30 SEETHE; 31 CALABRIA.

DOWN:—1 CAMPAIGN; 2 NUDGE; 3 OBSTACLES; 4 ELYSIAN; 6 TIDAL; 7 EC-CENTRIC; 8 MISTER; 9 HAWSER; 15 IMPUDENCE; 17 HARMONICA; 18 HYS-TERIA; 20 DOCILE; 21 SUMATRA; 23 EVICTS; 25 MARCH; 27 EGGER.

war against . . . the United Nations." Finally, it should not be forgotten that the Department of State declared in May, 1946, that Franco Spain had "fomented foci of Nazi-Fascist influence in the Western Hemisphere" and that "Spanish diplomatic officials and persons in Spanish quasi-official organizations have for years been encouraging groups in the other American republics which opposed inter-American unity against the Axis during the war and which still strive to perpetuate the principles of the Axis system in the New World."

It is clear therefore that fulfilment of U. N. principles and the stability of the United States demand that further action against the Franco regime be taken by the world organization. What measures would be effective? It is the general opinion of the friends of the Spanish people that to deny Franco gasoline and oil would weaken his motorized armed forces and ruin his economy; to deny him industrial machinery, coal, cotton, and other raw materials would cause his economic collapse and accelerate his political collapse; to cease buying Spanish products would deny him the foreign exchange he needs.

It is to be hoped that the recently appointed United States delegation to the General Assembly and the United States representative on the Security Council have been instructed in this sense and that they will lead energetic action to help the Spanish people rid themselves of Franco and establish, "free from force and intimidation," a government of their own choosing.

LUIS MONGUIO
Mills College, Cal., August 26

Life of Franz Boas

Dear Sirs: I am gathering material toward a life of the scientist Franz Boas, and I shall be glad to hear from any of your readers who knew him or have any writings of his.

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MURIEL RUKEYSER
New York, August 18

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